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Abstract 
The Arctic Circle is warming twice as fast as the rest of the world and with the shrinking polar 
caps, there exists an abundance of undiscovered oil, other natural resources, fish, and the 
prospect of fast and efficient sea routes. Unlike Antarctica on the opposite pole, the Arctic is a 
frozen ocean surrounded by continents with United States, Denmark, Russia, Canada, and 
Norway all laying claim to the area of exploitable territory. Russia in particular has the most 
vested interest in the area, covering half the coastline and inhabiting three-fourths of the Arctic 
population. In addition, composing 11% of Russia’s national income and an estimated 30% of 
the world’s undiscovered oil, the Arctic has been deemed vital to its national security and 
economic revival. My research project will demonstrate the importance of the Arctic Circle for 
Russian identity and national pride as well as the vitality of the region for its economy, 
particularly the oil industry. It will also seek to express Russia’s potential for cooperation with 
other Arctic states based on President Vladimir Putin’s Arctic policy, justified military activity 
and geopolitical actions and discredit Western authors claiming Russia intends to start a new 
“Cold War” over the region. My research will lastly present implications facing the future of the 
Arctic and provide policy recommendations as potential solutions.  
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Figure 1. 
Titanium Russian Flag Planted on the Seabed of the Lomonosov Ridge August 2nd, 2007 
(left). Arctic Explorer Artur Chilingarov at a press conference holding a picture of the 
flag (right). Source: “Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective,” Ohio State 
University  
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I. Introduction 
 
On August 2nd, 2007, Russian Arctic explorer Artur Chilingarov traveled in a 
submersible at a depth of 4,300 meters below the ice and planted a titanium Russian flag (see Fig 
1 above) on the seabed of the North Pole in order to assert Russian sovereignty and collect 
evidence to extend claims of exploitable territory within the Arctic. Despite the fact this claim 
was rejected by the United Nations, a few years later Chilingarov bluntly asserted that “we 
[Russia] will not give the Arctic to anyone.”1   
 Due to the rapid effects of climate change, a frozen ocean and one of the most sparsely 
populated regions in the world is becoming an area of geopolitical and economic contention 
among a number of international players. Shrinking polar caps cause the Arctic Circle to warm 
twice as fast as the rest of the world, and in turn have transformed the once desolate hinterland 
into an area of opportunity as melting ice brings promises of undiscovered natural resources and 
commercial sea routes. According to the National Snow and Ice Data Center, satellite data have 
shown that over the past 30 years, Arctic sea ice cover has declined by 30 percent and glaciers 
are retreating in northern Greenland and Canada.2 To emphasize the abundance of potential 
resources, a US Geological Survey study conducted in 2008 calculated “the sum of the mean 
estimates for each province indicates that 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of 
natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids may remain to be found in the Arctic.”3 
Another economic interest in the Arctic, the Northern Sea Route, or NSR, cuts the distance in 
half to travel from Europe to Asia through the alternative route of the Suez Canal (See Fig 2.1). 
                                               
1 Marlene Laurelle, Russia's Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North (M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2014) 
pp. 10.  
 
2 “Climate Change in the Arctic” (National Snow and Ice Data Center, 2012).  
 
3 Kenneth J. Bird, et al., “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas 
North of the Arctic Circle” ( US Geological Survey, 2008) pp. 1. 
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The NSR remained an impassable route to Arctic explorers for centuries, until climate change 
allowed the ice-free navigation season to extend from July to mid-October.  Unlike Antarctica’s 
land mass on the opposite pole, the Arctic Circle is a frozen ocean surrounded by continents with 
United States, Denmark, Russia, Canada, and Norway all laying claim to the areas of exploitable 
territory. The pie chart below depicts the approximate share of territory of the Arctic Ocean 
owned by each respective country based on the extent of their coastline, though the waters closer 
to the center by the North Pole are considered international waters. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Figure 2:  2.1 Route from Europe to Asia via the Northern Sea Route as opposed to the Suez 
Canal Route (left), Source: Russia Times International. 
  
Fig 2.2: Pie chart of approximate division of territory in the Arctic Circle by each member state 
(right).  Source: CIA World Factbook.  
 
At the root of this tension among the five states is international sea law over a disputed 
area in the Arctic Ocean called the “Lomonosov Ridge” where the aforementioned flag was 
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planted, believed to be rich in oil and mineral deposits. The concept of maritime sovereignty 
began in seventeenth century Great Britain, which claimed jurisdiction over the Atlantic Ocean 
and other surruonding seas for three nautical miles, known as “freedom of the seas.”4 By the 20th 
century, the U.S. began a trend of taking steps to claim control over greater nautical miles from 
the shore in 1945, however, it was not uniform, so in 1982 the United Nations adopted the 
Convention of Law on the Sea (UNCLOS) to regulate the oceans by dividing the sea floor into 
zones of national and international jurisdiction and designating exclusive economic zones, or 
EEZ. “Exclusive economic zone”5 is defined as the sovereign right for exploring, exploiting, and 
managing living/nonliving resources of the water, seabed and subsoil.6 The sea that extends 
beyond 200-350 nautical miles from the continental shore is considered international waters and 
is managed by the International Seabed Authority, a committee under UNCLOS. The other 
prominent international organization on the Arctic, the Arctic Council, was created in 1996 as an 
intergovernmental forum in response to environmental challenges and territorial conflict and 
includes the eight member countries: Denmark, Norway, Canada, Finland, Sweden, Iceland the 
United States and Russia. In addition, there are several “observer” states that are interested in the 
region but have no voting rights in the AC, such as China, South Korea, and Germany. The five 
states I will focus on in my paper are the five Arctic coastal states, (Denmark, Norway, U.S., 
Russia and Canada) that possess jurisdiction over territorial claims in the Arctic Ocean. All 
permenant members of the Arctic Council, except the United States, ratified UNCLOS shortly 
after it was created. 
                                               
4 Robert M. Bone, The Canadian North: Issues and Challenges. (Oxford University Press, 2012) pp. 282.  
 
5 “United Nations Commission on Limits of the Continental Shelf”(United Nations, 2013) Article 76. 
 
6 Bone, pp. 269. 
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Russia has undertaken several polar expeditions in the 21st century in order to provide 
sufficient evidence to UNCLOS that the Lomonosov Ridge is an extension of its Siberian 
continental shelf, such as the aforementioned 2007 expedition. Russia submitted its first bid to 
expand its EEZ in the Arctic in December of 2001, though the evidence provided was deemed 
insufficient by the United Nations. Seabed expeditions resumed in 2007 when the the Mir-1 and 
Mir-2 deep-sea submersibles descended to the seabed of the Arctic Ocean under the supervision 
of noted Russian polar explorer Artur Chilingarov.7 Following this expedition, Russia submitted 
another claim in 2015 with further evidence to extend its territory 1.2 million square kilometers 
into the Lomonosov Ridge, though this claim has yet to be ratified. However, the fact Russia 
planted a flag in 2007 over an area that extended outside of its EEZ immediately elicited 
negative reactions from the other members of the Arctic Council, as well as from the 
international audience. For instance, following this incidient the Canadian Prime Minister, Peter 
McKay, vehemently expressed, “We've established—a long time ago—that these are Canadian 
waters and this is Canadian property. You can't go around the world these days dropping a flag 
somewhere. This isn't the 14th or 15th century,"8 referring to Russia’s actions in the North Pole. 
The following year, in 2008, the United States and Canada conducted joint shelf research in the 
region to prove that the Lomonosov Ridge is a natural continuation of the American continent. 
Denmark also made similar claims that Greenland's continental shelf is directly linked with 
seabed geology. If disagreements over this particular region are not resolved, then the UN has 
the right to grant international status to the region which would allow non-polar states to gain 
traction in the arctic.   
                                               
7 See Fig. 1 on page 2.  
 
8 Nicholas Breyfogle and Jeffrey Dunifon, “Russia and the Race for the Arctic” Origins (Ohio State 
University, August 2012) pp. 1.  
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Russia especially has the most vested interest in the area out of all five Arctic states, 
covering over half the coastline and inhabiting three-fourths of the Arctic population. Starting in 
2000, President Vladimir Putin began to restore Soviet polar research bases and actively increase 
military and economic activity in the Arctic, which has “been deemed vital to its [Russia’s] 
national security and economic revival.”9  Russia’s economy is heavily reliant on the oil industry 
as the driving factor of its undiversified economy and therefore, the discovery of new undersea 
oil fields is of dire importance to the Russian Federation; for example, as of 2014, Arctic 
resources generate 20% of Russia’s annual GDP and approximately 70% of its oil reserves.10 
Additionally, the majority of the Northern Sea Route requires passing through Russian territorial 
waters, giving it the authority to set rules and implement tariffs on foreign vessels traversing 
through the route, especially since they normally require the assistance of Russian icebreaking 
ships. The NSR also allows Russia to more easily defend its coastline and Eastern shores and 
develop economic partnerships with Asiatic countries.  
Russia’s interests and motivations in the Arctic are not only economic, but also political, 
historical, and cultural. Documents originating from the Kremlin, such as “Основы 
государственной политики Российской Федерации в Арктике на период до 2020 года и 
дальнейшую перспективу/Fundamentals of the Russian Federation’s State Policy in the Arctic 
Until 2020 And Beyond,” outline Russia’s national interest in the Arctic and states intentions of 
preserving its role as the “leading Arctic power.”11 A large part of Russia’s geopolitical goals is 
                                               
9 Richard Loure, Putin: His Downfall and Russia's Coming Crash (Bedford Books, 2017) pp. 152. 
10 Laurelle, pp. 135-139. 
 
11 Дмитрий Медведев, Основы государственной политики Российской Федерации в Арктике на 
период до 2020 года и дальнейшую перспективу/Fundamentals of the Russian Federation’s State 
Policy in the Arctic Until 2020 And Beyond (Совет безопасности Российской Федерации, 2008) 
pp.10. 
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to maintain its status as the largest (geographically speaking) country in the world in order to 
reaffirm its position to the international audience as it lags behind in other areas of economic or 
political development. In order to protect economic interests and reaffirm its position, Russia 
maintains 27 operational military bases, an Arctic Northern Fleet, 40 icebreaking ships, Arctic 
motorized brigades, and a larger military industrial complex in the region than all of the other 
Arctic states combined.12 In comparison, the United States has merely one outdated icebreaking 
ship and a single operational military base in the Arctic and even Canada, the second largest 
Arctic state, has only three operational bases. However, Russia remains the only Arctic state that 
is not a member of NATO and remains threatened by their potential role in the Arctic in 
collaboration against Russia. It should be noted that NATO similarly feels threatened by its own 
inferior military capabilities. While Russia’s militarization of the Arctic may be to protect its 
own legitimate interests, this can cause a security dilemma between NATO and Russian 
militaries if not addressed properly, thus creating the situation more complicated. Upon the 
creation of the Arctic Council, the constitution omitted discussion of security negotiations and 
the five states lack a forum to conduct talks of military activity in the Circle. This has caused 
tensions to heighten, especially in recent years; for example, in the winter of 2018, NATO 
performed a massive military exercise called “Trident Juncture,”13 on Russia's Scandinavian and 
Arctic borders that lasted from October 25th-November 7th. These war games were based on the 
premise that Russia had invaded Scandinavia by ground, air, and sea and included 50,000 
participants from 31 NATO and partner countries, 250 aircrafts, 65 naval vessels, and up to 
10,000 tanks and other ground vehicles. In addition, U.S. Navy Secretary Richard Spencer 
                                               
12 Laurelle, pp. 121. 
 
13 “Exercise Trident Juncture 2018” (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2018).   
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recently claimed the his intent to conduct “freedom of navigation”14 exercises in Russian Arctic 
waters in 2019. Freedom of navigation operations (or FONOP) are conducted by the United 
States Navy to assert free water travel rights in disputed territorial waters, hoping to discourage 
or counter excessive claims. However, motivation behind these FONOP exercises appear 
condtardictory, since the U.S. Navy seeks to assert the integrity of international maritime zones, 
while at the same time Congress has yet to ratify the UNCLOS agreement on the Law of the Sea 
that officially defines the boundaries of international waters.  
As the Arctic enters into the next segment of the 21st century, attention is increasingly 
drawn to Russia’s hegemony and military might that is likely to remain of international interest 
since the effects of climate change are only accelerating, and to Russia’s benefit. Scholarly 
journals, politicians, and the media claim Putin’s activity in the Arctic is a bombastic 
demonstration of military prowess similar to events in Ukraine, the Baltic States and reflective of 
Cold War era tendencies. However, the Arctic Circle, unlike Crimea, Georgia or other post-
Soviet states, is not a country but an internationally designated ocean that is rapidly changing and 
developing into an environment with new implications. Therefore, in order to assess whether 
Russian activity in the Arctic is defensive or offensive, we need to approach its interests and 
motivations from a historical perspective, with consideration to events during the Soviet period, 
as well as economic endeavors, and the role of the climate and international organizations in the 
future of geopolitics in this region. The only way to avoid a security dilemma or possible 
military confrontation would be cooperation by strict adherence to the rule of law to provide 
transparency and consultation through international organizations from NATO-littoral Arctic 
states and Russia.  
                                               
14 Ben Kesling, “Cold War Games: U.S. Is Preparing to Test the Waters in Icy Arctic” (The Wall Street 
Journal, January 11th 2019). 
12 
Russia’s research and military efforts in the Arctic today echo the height of Arctic 
activity during the Soviet era, though under different circumstances. Tales of heroism and 
adventure during the 1930s in the Arctic still hold presence in the minds of the Russian people 
after they completed the first transpolar flight and landing on the North Pole. The following 
section will recount the history of active Russian presence in the Arctic and lay the groundwork 
for a more comprehensive analysis of how these events contributed to Putin’s current interest in 
economic and international revitalization of the Arctic.   
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II. Historical Background  
 
Russia’s active presence in the Arctic begins with Joseph Stalin during the Soviet era, but 
Russian interest in the Arctic date back centuries earlier with attempted explorations. Beginning 
in the 1500s, Dutch and English ships encountered Russians for the first time on the high seas 
while venturing over the Russian Arctic seeking new routes East. This led to commercial trade 
between Russia and England, most importantly the fur trade, and opened the Arctic Port of 
Arkhangelsk. Afterwards, the Tsars of Imperial Russia were relatively inactive in Arctic 
exploration until Peter the Great, “the scientifically minded modernizer of Russia,” launched the 
massive Great Northern Expedition from 1733-1749, involving over 3,000 men. 15  It was the 
first large-scale Arctic expedition of its time and resulted with claims to Alaska and several 
Arctic islands. Additionally, one of Russia’s greatest scholars of the time, Mikhail Lomonosov, 
heavily advocated the exploration and value of Siberia and the Northern Sea Route; he was later 
commemorated for his contributions to the Arctic by the naming of the Lomonosov Ridge during 
the Soviet Union. By the end of the 1700s, around one million Russians were living and working 
in Siberia owing to the expansion of the fur trade and discovery of natural resources and precious 
metals.16  Arctic exploration and development halted during the Russian Civil War, though 
resumed in full-force during the second half of the 1920s with the rise of Joseph Stalin. 
Stalin’s First Five Year Plan to industrialize the Soviet Union, for example, extended to 
the Far North. He wanted to establish Soviet power over native Siberians and control the 
economic resources of these regions. His five year plans had massive, insurmountable output 
                                               
15 John McCannon, Red Arctic: Polar Exploration and the Myth of the North in the Soviet Union, 1932-
1939 (Oxford University Press, 1998) pp. 14.  
The author wishes to express her indebtness to McCannon’s study for this historical background section.  
 
16 Ibid., pp. 15. 
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goals, and therefore he resorted to forced prison labor, or the GULAG17 system, to build large 
scale polar stations and icebreaking ships in order to explore and exploit the Arctic. In addition, 
he used Arctic scientific, economic, maritime, and aviation achievements to develop a cult of 
personality around his socialist propaganda. For example, the USSR became the first country to 
land an aircraft on the North pole, establish a scientific outpost there and conduct the first 
transpolar flight above the Arctic. Soviet aviators and explorers of the Arctic, or “Arctic heroes,” 
became international celebrities during the 1930s and contributed “a central, even definitive, 
feature of Stalinist popular culture and propaganda.”18 These heroes, with the help of extensive 
media, played a central role in the creation of Stalin’s socialist realism, or what John McCannon 
in the Red Arctic refers to as the “Arctic myth.” However, Stalin’s rapid development and 
unrealistic expectations brought almost all Arctic activities to a halt as the main administrative 
agency on the Arctic dismantled in less than a decade.  
The first main adminstrative agencies on the Arctic were formed in 1923 when the 
Academy of Sciences formed several polar commissions, both scientific and industrial. There 
emerged a number of bureaucratic agencies dealing with the Arctic, so they were centralized to 
three main organizations: the Committee of the North, the Arctic Institution and the Committee 
of the Northern Sea Route, or “Komseveroput,”19 or KSMP. The latter played the largest role 
pertaining to Arctic activity on the Northern Sea Route and held an enormous amount of 
responsibility at the outset of Stalin’s industrial planning. KSMP made improvements in sea 
navigation, air traffic, shipping, manufacturing and mining in the Arctic. On a cultural level, 
                                               
17  ГУЛАГ: Главное управление лагерей и мест заключения/Chief Administration of [Corrective 
Labor] Camps, though in English we use the acronym GULAG.  
 
18 Ibid., pp. 5. 
 
19 Комитет Северного Морского Пути/Committee of the Northern Sea Route. 
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KSMP aided Stalinist propaganda with transformation of the North into a region of the Soviet 
homeland and demonstration of mastery over the Northern Sea Route. However, incompetence, 
corruption and calls for faster growth hindered transportation and communication, causing the 
downfall and eventual dissolution of KSMP in 1933.20 
The “Main Administration of the Northern Sea Route,” pronounced in Russian as 
“Glavsevmorput” or GUSMP, replaced KSMP and was a more highly centralized body in charge 
of virtually all Soviet activities in the Arctic from 1932-38. It was an enormous agency, 
controlling essentially one-fourth of the USSR’s land east of the Ural Mountains, with a an 
estimated budget of 8.65 million roubles and employing 200,000 people.21 Professor Otto 
Schmidt, the chief of the Arctic Institute, headed GUSMP soon after it was formed and became a 
beloved figure of popular culture of the time, often endearingly referred to as “Commissar of 
Ice” or “Grandfather Frost.”22  He led the first single season crossing of the Northern Sea Route, 
the Sibiryakov Voyage, with Vladimir Vize from July to September of 1932. The following year, 
Schmidt attempted to repeat the same voyage with a larger passenger size and a non-icebreaking 
ship, the “Chelyuskin,” a vessel poorly equipped to traverse the dangerous Arctic waters. 
Unsurprisingly, the ship that left in October soon got stuck in the ice and eventually capsized in 
February of 1934, leaving 104 passengers, including a young woman who had just given birth, 
stranded in the Arctic in the middle of winter. They prepared for evacuation and set up “Camp 
Schmidt,” named after Otto Schmidt, to prepare settlement and survive the Arctic winter before 
they were evacuated. The entire epic story of their survival was sensationalized across the Soviet 
                                               
20 Ibid., pp. 24-32.  
 
21  Ibid., pp. 30. 
 
22  Ibid., pp. 35. 
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Union as they awaited passengers’ rescue. By April of that year, the Soviet Aviation fleet with 
seven heroic pilots rescued every single passenger that had boarded the Chelyuskin, completing 
the first Arctic air rescue and a tale of national triumph and they became known as the “Arctic 
hero” pilots. This tale emphasized the comradery and heroism of the pilots and those stranded at 
Camp Schmidt. 23 The “Arctic hero” pilots were celebrated by domestic and interational parades 
and grand tours; these parades greatly contributed to Stalinist ideology of heroism, comradery, 
and modernization marvels as these heroes came to be recognized across the country and around 
the world and soon became a crucial part of Soviet culture.   
In addition to the Arctic pilots rescue operation, GUSMP heavily invested in river, 
aviation, railroad, and sea transport from 1933-1936. Following the Chelyuskin epic, there were 
dramatic advances in aviation activities and air traffic increased from 512 in 1933 to 10,900 
hours by 1936.24 Other research, aviation, and naval feats were respectively greeted with parades 
and awards upon returning to Moscow and this period can be characterized with an aura of 
heroism and adventure. Further lending to Arctic myth and Stalinist propaganda, the Soviet 
Union broke 62 worldwide flying records between 1933-1938 and Stalin dubbed himself the 
“father of pilots.” 25 Otto Schmidt devised another plan with fellow prominent researcher, Ivan 
Papanin, to land on the North Pole by flight, an expedition called “SP-1.”26  The expedition was 
successful and after several landing attempts, the USSR became the first nation to ever land an 
aircraft at the North Pole in May of 1937. A few months later in June, Valery Chkalov, one of 
the Arctic hero pilots in the Chelyuskin epic, became the first person to transverse the North pole 
                                               
23 Ibid., pp. 64. 
 
24 Ibid., pp. 56. 
 
25 Ibid., pp. 69. 
 
26 Ibid., pp. 75. 
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by aviation, flying more than 5,288 miles over a period of 63 hours from Moscow to Vancouver 
and then Washington State, opening a new air route between Russia and North America. Despite 
some friendliness and admiration between the US and USSR in Arctic feats, there always 
remained uneasiness and a level of competitive hostility, especially during the Cold War era as 
the Arctic became an area of contention between the two nations. 
The Arctic hero pilots and explorers dominated the popular culture of the Soviet Union 
for a decade: in the press, literature, films, arts, radio, posters etc. and became a hallmark of 
socialist realism. It was transformed into a romanticized and glamorized picture of life in the Far 
North engineered through the mass media complex that was under the control of the Kremlin. 
Journalists and photographers accompanied Arctic expeditions and even conducted 
documentaries, such as Expedition on the Ice.27 Museums and special exhibitions dedicated to 
the Arctic were built by the state and an exhibit on the USSR in the Arctic even made an 
appearance at the New York World Fair in 1939. The Arctic myth helped fulfill socialist realism 
ideals and communism itself by emphasizing collective teamwork and the intimate link between 
the country as a whole and the heroes of the Soviet Union. In addition, the North Pole 
represented the last frontier untouched by man until it was conquered by Soviet Aviation and a 
literal and figurative representation of mastery over the top of the world. The popularity of the 
Arctic flying proved successful in generating public support of Arctic adventures, also in part 
due to the marvel of modern aviation technology of the time period. To international neighbors, 
the myth helped the USSR project itself as a friendly peace loving nation, though simultaneously 
also a military force to be reckoned with.28 By the time John McCannon published Red Arctic, in 
                                               
27 Ibid., pp. 123.  
 
28 Ibid., pp. 94. 
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1998, the Arctic feats of the 1930s were still well alive in the national memory of post-Soviet 
Russia, as documented by his interview with Russians.29 
However, it can be argued that in reality, propaganda and socialist realism masked the 
hardships of the Arctic living and the bleak lives of those working at the polar stations, in 
particular the thousands of prisoners that died under GULAG system. The myth was also used to 
divert attention away from the harsh reality of Soviet life and Stalin’s purges of the 1930s. The 
glory of Arctic expeditions began to fade away with the threat of WWII and the death and 
failures of several polar aviators. By the end of 1937, the Arctic madness and functioning and 
efficiency of GUSMP declined significantly and after Otto Schmidt stepped down and GUSMP 
demoted, the administration never regained its prominence in the Arctic. In the end GUMSP 
achieved major feats, but with difficulties and not nearly as far reaching as the regime had 
intended. Arctic activity did not completely halt with the fall of GUSMP and the death of Stalin 
and remained moderately active for the remainder of the 20th century, though the development of 
the Arctic from the 1940s to the end of the Soviet Union was more intermittent and haphazard 
than the previous decade. For example, ten ships were able to make a complete traversal of the 
Northern Sea Route in 1939 and freight turnover far exceeded plans.30 Other achievements 
accomplished during this period included two pilots flying to the Pole of Relative Inaccessibility 
located near the North Pole in 1941 and the discovery of the Lomonsov Ridge. In addition, the 
Northern Sea Route became an area of critical importance during World War II, linking 
American and Asiatic allies and moving supplies and personnel.  
Although, the Arctic was a point of contention during the height of the Cold War because 
it was the shortest geographical distance between the US and USSR. Moreover, ice sheets 
                                               
29  Ibid., pp. 180. 
30 Ibid., pp. 174.  
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prevented detection of nuclear submarine patrols and early warning radars were designed after 
IBMs, or intercontinental ballistic missiles, were unveiled during the Cold War.31 Almost no 
Arctic accomplishments were achieved in the 1990s and Arctic activity only reached similar 
levels to the Stalin-era with the acession of President Putin in 2000. Thus it can be concluded 
that, the peak of Arctic activity in the 20th century is mostly attributed to the Stalin’s rule and 
dissolved with the fall of the Soviet Union because motivations in Soviet Arctic policy was more 
a reflection of Soviet ideology and immediate economic benefits in his Five-Year plans, as 
opppose to the long-term, consistent policy we encounter today in the Arctic. Nevertheless, this 
active historical presence laid the groundwork for modern Arctic policy in the 21st century and 
provided justification for Russia’s claims to Arctic territories.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
31 Ibid., pp. 175.  
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III. Putin’s Arctic Policy 
In view of the previous section, it becomes clear how and why the current Russian 
government and its people regard the Arctic with a sense of identity and pride based on their 
historical significance. The Arctic myth of the 1930s promoted the idea of man (Russians) 
conquering nature - a recurring theme in Russian nationalism that continues to this day in feats of 
military prowess and economic prominence in one of the coldest climates in the world. Several 
objectives of the Soviet Arctic can be paralleled with contemporary Russian Arctic policy, 
especially with resource ambitions, however, there are arguably more points of contrast than 
comparison. In my opinion, President Vladimir Putin’s Arctic policy represents largely a long-
term, far-reaching economic plan that includes military development to protect these interests, by 
way of contrast to Stalin’s short-term ideological and assimilation goals in the Arctic. 
Additionally, with the progression of climate change and globalization, new challenges and 
opportunities arise in the contemporary Russian Arctic that were not previously encountered 
during the Soviet era. For example, climate change has provided opportunities to expand 
economic interests in the Arctic, already comprising 20% of its national GDP and an essential 
part of Russia’s reviving economy. Furthermore, the USSR’s legal status of the Arctic and 
claims to its territory was never challenged, despite the fact the Arctic was a point of intense 
confrontation during the Cold War. In the current era of globalization, international law is held 
with significant gravity and the effects of climate change have transformed the legal status of 
each Arctic country into an issue of the utmost importance with regard to coastal and nautical 
boundaries. One of these legal issues, for instance, concerns the Northern Sea Route, primarily 
utilized for Russia’s domestic use between selected straits until the early 21st century.32 Ice melt 
                                               
32 Sergey Smirnov and Anton Kostyuk, “The Legal Issues of Arctic Exploration” (Asian Pacific Journal 
of Marine Science, 2012) pp.101.   
21 
and expansion of geographical boundaries opened the route to viable international commerce and 
now Russia’s claim to “internal waters” of the NSR is being contested.  
 I believe that the rapid development of Putin’s Arctic policies originate from a stagnation 
of Arctic activity at the end of 20th century, rather than from a duplication of goals during the 
Stalin-era. In the 1990s, President Boris Yeltsin and the federal government perceived Russia’s 
Arctic regions “as a burden or source of various socio-economic problems rather than an 
economically promising region.”33 Essentially all Arctic activity during the 1990s was halted: 
polar stations were abandoned, scientific explorations ceased, and air and maritime traffic levels 
reached record low points. In an address to the Federal Assembly in 2005, Putin referred to the 
fall of the USSR as the  “major geo-political catastrophe of the century,”34 not because Russia 
lost its territory and military power, but due to the fact it was followed by one of the worst 
periods economically-speaking in Russian history and consequently lost its international 
standing. As soon as Putin came to office, he began to centralize control and enact a number of 
economic reforms with ambitious goals, the Arctic being a vital component of these policies. He 
additionally sought to re-establish the Arctic as a region of military-strategic importance. At a 
Munich Security conference in 2007, Putin called for Russia to play an increasingly active role in 
world affairs,35 the same year the “Arktika” expedition was launched to the North Pole. Putin’s 
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goals as outlined in his Arctic policies and statements are namely two-fold: to protect domestic 
interests through the Northern Sea Route and natural resources, and secondly, to establish Russia 
as the Arctic hegemon, militarily and politically, as the only non-littoral NATO Arctic nation. 
Other Arctic nations and observers are quick to frame this as a sequel to Stalin’s Arctic military-
industrial complex, however, I argue this is an entirely different situation with contrasting goals, 
ideologies, and political and environmental climates. For example, Paul Josephen in The 
Conquest of the Russian Arctic argues Putin’s development of Arctic industries and the Northern 
Sea Route are solely driven by an attempt to reproduce Soviet Arctic greatness.36 However, 
owning more than half of the Arctic coastline and being one of the largest exporters of oil in the 
world, Russia’s stakes in the region are arguably much greater than any other Arctic nation; 
therefore, it has reason to secure its Arctic borders and develop its Exclusive Economic Zone in 
conjunction with its military. Parts of Putin’s Arctic policies may in fact advance his ideological 
nationalism, though, as demonstrated by the subsequent Arctic policies, this is not his main focus 
of attention in the region. 
Arctic policy began to be drafted in the early 2000s, although it was not until 2008 that 
Russia’s first post-Soviet Arctic policy designed to address mainly domestic measures in the 
Arctic was passed under President Dmitri Medvedev. The primary goals of  “Основы 
государственной политики Российской Федерации в Арктике на период до 2020 года и 
дальнейшую перспективу” included international peace and cooperation efforts and the 
redevelopment of resource extraction and the NSR for Russia’s economic goals. 37 In 2009, two 
more Arctic policies were subsequently passed: the “Стратегия Ннациональной 
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Безопасности Российской Федерации до 2020 года/Strategy for National Security of the 
Russian Federation until 2020”38 emphasizing the military’s role in protecting Arctic interests, 
and the “Энергетическая Стратегия России до 2030 года/Russian Energy Strategy up to 
2030,”39 which underlined the importance of the Arctic in regard to natural resources. When 
Putin returned to the Kremlin in 2011, Moscow developed still greater detailed Arctic policies 
that centralized the Arctic administrations and enhanced Russia’s security posture in the region. 
Worried about Western interference and in the interest of updating outdated Soviet military 
equipment, he announced the creation of the first Arctic brigade in 2012, established a missile 
defense system and instructed the Navy to resume patrols of the NSR. 40 The “Стратегии 
развития Арктической зоны Российской Федерации и обеспечения национальной 
безопасности на период до 2020 года/Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the 
Russian Federation”41 approved in February 2013 was a follow-up to the first Arctic policy 
passed in 2008, also calling for the protection of Russian national interests and was essentially 
designed for “domestic rather than international consumption.”42 At any rate, there were 
components that mentioned initiatives on the international front, including channels of 
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international cooperation for sustainable development of the Arctic in environmental and safety 
measures. It also provided detailed military tasks in order to ensure military readiness to protect 
Russian interests in its Exclusive Economic Zone, deter potential threats and improve air and 
maritime monitoring systems. Therefore, in the following year, Russia announced the reopening 
and modernization plan of fifty military airfields by 2020 and the creation of the Northern Fleet-
United Strategic Command for the Arctic. In addition, the Arctic Commission was established in 
2015, responsible for all social, economic, and national security developments of the region 
chaired by Dmitry Rogozin. That same year, Russia also issued a revised Морская 
Доктрина/Maritime Doctrine43 issuing the development of the Northern Fleet to defend 
economic interests and also resubmitted its claim to the UN Continental Shelf Commission to 
extend its Arctic territory.  
While the Arkitka expedition and the planting of the flag in 2007 was symbolic and 
arguably confrontational, bombastic and nationalistic statements concerning the Arctic do not 
appear in Russia’s federal Arctic policy or in speeches by Putin. The main purpose of this 
expedition apparently was to resubmit Russia’s claim to the Lomonosov Ridge. Yet, American 
media outlets and policy reports on the Arctic often reference and sensationalize this flag and 
nationalistic statements by government officials as Russia’s official and definitive stance on the 
Arctic to produce the image of Russia invoking a new “Cold War.” For example, in a report 
produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies on “Russia’s Strategic Reach to 
the Arctic,” it refers to a quote on several occasions by Dmitry Rogozin, stating the Arctic is 
“our territory” and foreshadowed “serious economic collisions in the 21st century,”44 despite the 
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fact he chaired the Arctic Commission for merely a single year. In my opinion, this selective bias 
results in a skewed perspective of misinformation and frames Russia as the adversary in the 
Arctic, instead of assessing the potential for international cooperation. Critically acclaimed 
American author and journalist, Richard Lourie, similarly warns the Arctic will become “an 
undersea Crimea that must be seized and annexed in defiance of all law, even at the risk of 
war.”45 However, Russian policy statements have never declared intentions of annexing regions 
of the Arctic and the government has abided by the international law in its submission of its 
claim to the Lomonosov Ridge. Even Artur Chilingarov, the Russian explorer who planted the 
flag and laid claim to the Lomonosov Ridge as Russian territory, stated “in the Arctic there are 
no problems that cannot be solved on the basis of mutual understanding and constructive 
dialogue,”46 emphasizing Russia’s willingness to cooperate on the international front, not act as 
an aggressor. The subsequent section on geopolitics in chapter 7 will assess the nature of 
territorial disputes and dialogue and demonstrate Russia’s willingness towards international 
cooperation, especially along the Northern Sea Route. It should be noted that Russia is not the 
only country with nationalistic statements regarding its portion of the Arctic: Canadian 
government officials have made similar claims to the Northwest Passage and declare the area its 
internal waters; however, this claim has gained less international attention since commercial 
travel has grown much more slowly owing to difficultly in navigation through the islands of the 
archipelago; and while Canada’s scientists are working closely with their American and Danish 
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counterparts, “each nation with jealousy defend its ‘right’ to the Arctic seabed” according to 
Canadian Arctic scholar Robert Bone.47   
The development of Arctic policies since 2008 may be seen to have built off of one 
another and consistently have referred to the protection of national interest and security and 
according to the authors continuously uphold the integrity of international organizations. In an 
article written by Valery Konyshev and Alexander Sergunin from the Department of 
International Relations at St. Petersburg State University, Russia’s policies in the Arctic 
represent a mix of “hard and soft power”48 approaches for their own domestic economic and 
political interest of an area that composes a significant portion of Russia’s economy and focuses 
on modernization of industrial and military programs; yet for the most part, Russia clearly 
demonstrates that it prefers to use soft power49 more often than hard power, as well as act via 
international organization. Konyshev and Sergunin argue that Moscow’s Arctic policies are 
predictable, pragmatic and follow a pattern of “responsible cooperation.” 50 Arguably, it should 
come as no surprise that the reinforcement of Arctic military was an inevitable provision of the 
development of the Arctic region since normal policing forces are not suited to patrol the harsh 
climate of these regions.  
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From the view of Russia’s domain, the country has important economic, political, 
cultural, and military strategic points of interests in the Arctic that are proclaimed at the federal 
level to be protected, but security challenges and threats necessitate the development and 
modernization of defense programs in the Arctic. As outlined by a number of primary source 
documents originating from the Kremlin’s website, Putin has never stated Russia’s Arctic policy 
as seeking to demonstrate expansionist military power, though Western scholars and media 
continue to accuse Russia as being combative and militant, as demonstrated by the authors 
mentioned above. An analysis of the military operations in the following chapter will prove that 
Russia is following a strategic deterrence initiative. The critical importance of Russia’s interests, 
its vulnerabilities, and the goal of remaining the dominant player in the Arctic region have 
necessitated a high level of Russian military activity in the Arctic region in order to protect its 
domestic interests in terms of its economy and national security. 
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IV. Defense  
While Russia’s military advancement remains the most controversial of its Arctic 
policies, its pragmatic economic and security concerns arguably necessitate an Arctic military 
development that is defensive rather than offensive in nature. From a realist perspective, Russia’s 
military is assuming a form of strategic deterrence out of fear that NATO and other non-Arctic 
states are attempting to sideline Russia in the emerging Arctic system. One could argue that 
security threats to Russian interests drive its military behavior, though it is not operating from an 
“offensive realist” stance in which states seeks to continually amass power, as many Western 
sources claim. In my opinion, Russia is entitled and expected to actively develop and protect its 
borders and security of national resources, and has done so through a number of predictable 
Arctic policies beginning in 2008. Compared to other Arctic nations on an individual level, 
Russia’s military programs may seem very large to scale; however, Russia views its military as 
being exposed to all Arctic NATO-littoral states in addition to other non-Arctic states interested 
in reaping economic benefits from the region, such as China and other Asiatic countries.51 
According to authors Marlene Laurelle and Sergunin and Konyshev in their analysis below, 
Russia’s military goals are logical and domestically oriented, specifically seeking to protect and 
patrol its territory from nonconventional challenges, not to prepare for interstate conflict.52 
Additionally, the lack of institutional channels to discuss security matters in the Arctic as well as 
geopolitical uncertainty understandably encourages Russia to keep preemptively acting in a 
defensive maner. 
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As mentioned in previous sections, authors such as Richard Lourie continue to explain 
Putin’s militarization of the Arctic as a direct continuation of Stalin’s Arctic policy because 
Russia’s current Arctic military seeks to demonstrate to the international community that they 
have world-class military capabilities in a similar fashion as during the Soviet-era. However, 
other authors such as Dmitri Trenin counter the idea whether the two time periods are even 
comparable. He points to the fact the defining factors of the Cold War included strategic stability 
of a bipolar global system with just two major adversaries and a bilateral arms control;53 this 
does not define the current international situation of multipolar stability, and especially not in the 
Arctic. Additionally, Russia’s rapid military advancement has to be analyzed in historical context 
of the abandonment of the Arctic regions in the late 20th century and in numerical terms 
comparatively to the Cold War, as demonstrated by the study conducted by Sergunin and 
Konyshev in the tables below.54 Table 1 below demonstrates that current Russian military 
programs remain well below Cold War levels, submarines numbering over 100 in 1980 
compared to only a few dozen today. Comparatively, table 2 demonstrates that NATO forces 
have actually increased the number of submarines and larger ships in the Arctic since the Cold 
War era. Consequently, if any Arctic nation is invoking a “Cold War” arms race, it does not 
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appear to be the Russian Federation. 
 
 
NATO often assesses Russia’s militarization of the Arctic and its threat in terms of 
equipment and military operations, rather than intent and purpose. While we recall that the 
region was essentially abandoned for a decade, a significant portion of Putin’s military expansion 
programs is required for the modernization of outdated Soviet equipment that has not been 
utilized or modernized for at least a decade. For example, the Northern Fleet currently consists of 
only 17 nuclear-powered submarines compared to 78 in 1989 and it is estimated 40-70% of the 
vessels are no longer fully operational according to a report from the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies in 2015.55 The Northern Fleet was allocated a very large portion of the 
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military budget to purchase new surface ships and nuclear/classic diesel submarines, though this 
was mainly in response to the announcement that a majority of its ships were planning to be 
decommissioned.56 Medvedev’s “Транспортная стратегия Российской Федерации до 2030 
года/Transport Strategy of the Russian Federation up to 2030”57 approved in 2008 called for the 
need to develop the Northern Sea Route, its infrastructure and communication systems, and the 
modernization of the icebreaker fleet, whose ships were constructed in the 1970s/80s. According 
to Russia’s first Arctic policy58, the Russian Navy and Northern Fleet resumed its warship 
presence in 2008 to secure national interests in the Arctic, notably the Northern Sea Route, 
which remains of upmost security importance for border control and maritime safety. The 
Northern Fleet accounts for two-thirds of Russian Navy’s global nuclear force and is the most 
powerful of the fleets. It is responsible for protecting the country’s economic interests, especially 
energy, along with monitoring tanker traffic. In conjunction with Транспортная стратегия 
Российской Федерации, another document, the Морская Доктрина до период 2020 года, 
plans to transform the Russian Navy, allocating $132 billion for shipbuilding, a quarter of the 
military budget.59  Russia also increased the development of submarines and under-ice training in 
2006, the first time in 11 years.60 While these measures are designed to avoid possible future 
ballistic missile defense weapons and build nuclear deterrent systems, the Northern Fleet also 
requires modernization in order to conduct rapid intervention operations. Many ships in the 
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Northern Fleet are also incapable of conducting rapid search and rescue operations because they 
are not designed to ice class standards, another reason the defense program has allocated billions 
of dollars in investments. 
With expanded use of the Northern Sea Route, come dangers to foreign and domestic 
commercial vessels from the harsh Arctic climate, even with the assistance of icebreaking ships. 
The development of the NSR and Northern Fleet is also in part a response to larger expected 
shipping volumes and the new threats that have arisen with the proliferation of maritime traffic, 
such as collisions and criminal activity. As mentioned earlier, normal policing forces are not 
suitable to patrol the Northern Sea Route and, therefore, require expansion of Arctic military to 
protect civilian activity and conduct search and rescue operations. Author Danita Catherine 
Burke from the Centre for War Studies at the University of Denmark warns that the images 
currently presented of military in the Arctic harking back to the Cold War era are misleading 
because military buildup is not always hostile and can be blurred between civilian activities like 
providing policing support for economic interests. She argues that for Russia in particular “issues 
of national security are wide ranging and are not solely a matter of building capacity to defend 
oneself from or in war,”61 meaning the functions of Russia’s Arctic military are not purely for 
security purposes, but also predominantly for safety and patrol measures. According to the 
Основы государственной политики Российской Федерации в Арктике на период до 2020 
года, all power structures of the military are assigned to join search and rescue missions that are 
in cooperation with other Arctic nations. Russia has planned construction of 13 airfields, 10 
search and rescue stations, 16 deep-water ports, and 10 air defense radar stations.62  In addition, 
                                               
61 Danita Catherine Burke, “Why the New Arctic 'Cold War' Is a Dangerous Myth” (The Conversation, 
December 3rd, 2018). 
 
62 Conley and Rohloff, pp. 73. 
33 
11 border protection facilities were also built that are expected to host commercial vessels along 
with Northern Fleet ships.  
In addition to increased naval activity, President Putin announced in 2007 the formation 
of Arctic brigades and that Russian bombers would resume long-distance patrol flights. “Starting 
today, such tours will be conducted regularly and on the strategic scale,” he said, “Our pilots 
have been grounded for too long,”63 indicating that the purpose of these exercises was to revive 
long neglected aircraft exercises; Putin also announced this so as not to frighten other Arctic 
states by conducting an unannounced aircraft exercise. Although these exercises can appear 
reminiscent of Stalin’s air activity of the 1930s, Russian air force activity is not nearly as 
important as other developments in the Arctic today, and the Navy continues to hold the highest 
importance in Arctic military development. Moreover, border security remains an important 
driving factor of military development. The first Arctic program declared the maintenance of 
general-purpose military formations, in addition to the development of border units capable of 
“ensuring border security under various military and political circumstances.”64 Two Arctic 
Brigade Special Force Units serve as border guard units and the Federal Security Service, or 
FSB, is responsible for the protection of Russia’s coastline and monitoring the security of the 
NSR, leading troops that patrol Arctic waters by air. Other military installations in the Arctic 
include: firing ranges, rocket launch sites, strategic missile forces, and motorized brigades.   
The U.S. is mainly concerned with the development of nuclear weapons in the Kola Peninsula, 
however, the peninsula has become a vital point of interest to the Russian Navy and FSB, since it 
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is a very convenient location for missile early warning systems and other elements of strategic 
deterrence systems and guarantees access to the Atlantic Ocean.65  
While many NATO military leaders accuse Russia as offensive in nature, an analytical 
report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies acknowledges the necessity of 
Russia’s increased Arctic militarization given its circumstances:  
The Kremlin’s ambitious plans for the Arctic are understandable as it increasingly relies 
on Arctic natural and mineral resources as well as developing a new international 
shipping route for its economy… It is also appropriate that Russia readjusts its security 
and border forces to account for increased economic and human activity along the 
Northern Sea Route.66 
 
Nevertheless, deep-rooted armament tension remains between NATO and Russia, 
intensifying fears and generating security activism in the Arctic, since “US unilateralism and 
NATO activities continue to be classified as threatening Russia.”67 In addition, Russian military 
activity elsewhere in the world, including in Crimea in 2014, have negatively impacted 
cooperation in the Arctic and provided an obstacle to improving military relations with other 
members of the Arctic Council, in particular the United States. Following Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea, for example, U.S. and EU countries targeted exports to Russia in deep sea drilling, 
Arctic exploration and shale oil extraction along with the termination of military contacts 
between the U.S. and Russia. Estimates from 2014 report Russian military development were 
behind schedule, in part due to Western sanctions.68 Russia subsequently staged the Vostok-2014 
military drills that were the largest of its kind since the Soviet era designed to test its Far East 
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forces. Another exercise with was staged with the Northern Fleet in 2015 in response to 
Norway’s Joint Viking drills and in order to strengthen the Naval presence. The increased 
number of military drills following the Ukrainian crisis could be in part due to pressure from 
sanctions and the increased presence of NATO on Russia’s borders, generating a strategic sense 
of isolation. For example, in the winter of 2018, NATO performed a military exercise in Norway 
called “Trident Juncture” involving more than 50,000 troops, 65 ships and 250 aircrafts. NATO 
insisted that the war games were purely defensive and posed no threat to immediate neighbors, 
even though the exercise was designed to react to a circumstance were an Arctic nation to invade 
Norway, the closest Arctic bordering country to Russia. Journalist Martin Berger69 raises an 
important parallel situation to put Russian militarization into perspective: what would the US do 
if Mexico created a military alliance with Russia and deployed warheads on the immediate 
vicinity of the American border?  Increasing military forces would probably be the first option, 
therefore, Russia’s defense of its Arctic borders is arguably justified, especially as threatening 
adversaries are constantly conducting military operations on its borders. The absence of military 
contacts has caused an incessant amount of military exercises staged by NATO and Russia, 
provoking a secularity dilemma.   
However, it appears that not all members of NATO hold a corresponding impression of 
Russia’s military presence in the Arctic. According to an associate professor at the Norwegian 
Institute for Defense Studies, Paal Sigurd Hilde, Norway is reluctant to increase its defense 
spending with NATO allies because "People don't feel particularly threatened by Russia. They 
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don't consider a conflict likely,"70 indicating only certain Arctic states view Russia’s 
militarization of the Arctic as a threatening offensive presence, principally the United States. In 
addition, Canadian Brigadier General Mike Nixon pointed to the fact that Russia’s Arctic 
military activity remains well below Cold War levels (as indicated earlier in Table 1) and 
dismissed the idea of potential land grabs or invasions.71 On the other hand, the United States 
views Russian and Chinese activity in the Arctic with attention and admonition. Navy Secretary 
Richard Spencer is concerned about Russian “aggressiveness”72 in the Arctic and has called for 
the opening of a strategic port in the Bering Strait and increased naval presence for a region the 
U.S. has largely discounted. Washington not only prepares to conduct freedom of navigation 
exercises73 in the Arctic, but is also increasing the number of troops and fighter jets at a military 
base in Alaska and upgrading Northern Warning Radar Systems. However, any aims of U.S. 
Naval powers attempting to match Russia’s presence in the Arctic are not realistic, at least within 
the next few decades, despite the fact that former President Obama vowed to close the 
“icebreaker gap” 74 with Russia. The intended militarization of the United States in the Arctic has 
contributed to this security dilemma, despite the fact Russia continues to emphasize its defensive 
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stance. For instance, in an address to the Federal Assembly on February 20th, 2019, President 
Putin emphasized Russia’s defensive security stance in the Arctic and around the world, stating, 
“Russia wants to have sound, equal and friendly relations with the USA. Russia is not 
threatening anyone, and all we do in terms of security is simply a response, which means that our 
actions are defensive. We are not interested in confrontation and we do not want it, especially 
with a global power like the United States of America.”75  President Putin stresses the fact the 
international system no longer resides in a bipolar system, such as during the Cold War, and 
Russia is not interested in acting in a confrontational manner with NATO.  
The increased military presence in the Arctic, Putin claims, is in response to climate 
change concerns, economic interests and increased commercial use as well as insecurities along 
Russia’s borders. He argues that it is important that Russia in particular develops and modernizes 
its military infrastructure in order to protect its coastline that comprises over half the Arctic 
border and a significant portion of their economy. Militarization of the Arctic has increased 
tensions between NATO and Russia arguably due to misinterpretation of Russia’s ambitions and 
policies in the region. From an assessment of its Arctic developments, Russia’s intent in the 
military development is not primarily focused on projecting military power, but also on the 
modernization of equipment, safety concerns in search and rescue missions, the protection of its 
borders and the Northern Sea route that call for the legitimate re-allocation of resources towards 
the military. President Putin’s foreign policy in the Arctic acts in a manner of strategic deterrence 
from threatening adversaries. Russian Foreign Ministry’s Spokesman Maria Zakharova stated 
after the Trident Juncture exercise in 2018 that “The Arctic and the north of Europe must remain 
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a low-tension zone, adding that saber-rattling in the region may have long-lasting 
ramifications.”76 The Arctic Council omitted any discussion of security negotiations from its 
Constitution and there are currently no forums to prevent this security dilemma, which may 
explain the increase in tensions between Russia and NATO. One may plausibly argue that Russia 
is attempting to update its military operations, not to provide offensive forces nor recreate the 
colossal military industrial complex of the Soviet era. It is not expanding its sphere of influence, 
but defending economic and security interests and has stated its commitment to ensure the region 
remains an area of peace and cooperation, and consequently cannot be viewed as a revisionist 
Arctic military power. The Deputy Director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, 
Alexander Khramchikhin, argues that the creation of military groups on Arctic Islands and the 
development of the Northern Fleet is “не просто оправданным, но совершенно необходимым 
шагом” or “not just justified, but an absolutely necessary step”77 due to the rapidly changing 
environmental and geopolitical situation that necessitates the protection of national security 
interests in a period of heightened tensions. Russia has ambitious military programs for the 
Arctic, although it is not plausible that it will be able to fulfill all its goals with the current 
financial and technological constraints and without foreign financial assistance, meaning that 
some of these ambitions may go unrealized. Russia similarly has ambitious programs for its 
economy activity in the Arctic. The following section will expound upon the critical importance 
of Russia’s Arctic industries for its economy, which its militaries protect- namely that of 
maritime travel and resource extraction.   
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V. Russia’s Arctic Economy: Natural Resources and Maritime Transport 
 
 To reiterate, Russia’s Arctic policy is focused on security (for the reasons detailed in the 
previous section) and also economic resources. Next to national security, the Russian Defense 
Ministry has stated the protection of economic resources is Russia’s primary concern in its Arctic 
policies.78 The Arctic alone generates 20% of Russia’s GDP and this number continues to grow 
with larger investments into the region.79  If there were no economic benefits to reap from the 
Arctic, the Putin administration would arguably have little to no interest in developing the 
region. The text of policy regarding Russia’s economic goals in the Arctic is found in a number 
of documents divided by energy/mineral resources and maritime shipping/transport executive 
departments.80  
Natural Resources 
As mentioned in the introduction to my study, a 2008 US Geological Survey study 
estimated that the Arctic may contain 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil and up to 30% of 
the world’s undiscovered gas resources,81 most of which are believed to be found in Russia’s 
Exclusive Economic Zone. The total value of all mineral and energy resources amounted to 
55.24 trillion rubles in 2017, which included revenue from 35 trillion cubic meters of oil 
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reserves,82 according to the Ministry of Natural Resources. With a continental shelf area of 6.2 
million square kilometers containing a majority of the Arctic’s natural resources, Russia has 
taken extensive measures to protect these resources. This is not solely in the interest of 
demonstrating dominance over its own territory, but also because it is vitally necessary for the 
functioning of its economy that is heavily dependent on the energy sector. Russia lacks economic 
diversification, with oil and natural gas accounting for 60% of its GDP in 2017,83 and remains 
one of the largest exporters of oil in the world. According to Ben van Beurden, the CEO of Shell 
gas company, Russia could potentially become the world’s largest oil producer in the near future, 
by reason of its vast abundance of natural resources and an increasing global demand for natural 
gas.84  
The energy industry was also critical during the Soviet Union, who was the paramount oil 
producer in the world at the time, with an oil peak of 569 million tons per year.85 The largest gas 
fields in Russia, which tend to be more lucrative than oil, were discovered in the 1960s during 
the Soviet era. However, located in Western and Southern Siberia, these fields are beginning to 
deplete in the 21st century, and therefore Russia has been compelled to seek alternative fields of 
natural gas extraction. The 2011 “Генеральная схема развития газовой отрасли /General 
Scheme of Development of the Gas Industry Development” states that the “domestic oil sector is 
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at a critical stage,”86 due to aging oil fields and emphasized the need for new oil reserves to 
offset the declining output. When Putin began to recentralize the Russian economy in the early 
2000s, the energy sector was of principal importance to his economic reforms and he turned to 
the Arctic for new fields of extraction, considered to be a gold mine for hydrocarbon wealth. 
This is not to imply President Putin aspires towards a Soviet ideal, but rather that these reforms 
lie in the interest of reviving the collapsing economy from the disasters of the 1990s, similarly to 
military infrastructure. Russia’s first economic policy in the Arctic- the Энергетическая 
Стратегия России до 2020 года/Energy Strategy for Russia Up to 2020- was approved in 
August of 2003 and pointed to the Arctic as strategic for the country’s economic future.87 This 
document was revised in 2009 and the Энергетическая Стратегия России до 2030 года 
called for the development and investment of hydrocarbon resources in the continental shelf of 
the Arctic and Yamal Peninsula; it additionally states that the strategy for implementing this 
policy requires effective international cooperation on “risky and complex projects”88 in the 
Arctic. The Yamal-Nenets and the Timan-Pechora/Barent Sea regions are of particular 
importance for the oil and gas industries, supplying most of Russia’s natural gas. The Yamal 
LNG, or liquefied natural gas, project has been allocated $2.5 billion to create the largest and 
most complex LNG project in the world to extract natural gas from the South Tambey Field 
reserves, amounting to 2 trillion cubic meters of natural gas.89   
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In addition to oil and natural gas, the Arctic shelf contains a number of other mineral 
riches, such as zinc, copper, tin, nickel, diamonds, gold, and silver and there are than 25 centers 
of mining activities operating in the Russian Arctic. These rare minerals and metals are essential 
inputs for technology and their price has recently increased as a result of technological demand 
in the 21st century.90 Fishing industries additionally hold a similar amount of significance in 
economic resources. Climate change, for example, is pushing marine ecosystems and fauna 
farther north with warmer waters. Russia's coastline is the second largest in the world after 
Indonesia and catches in the Bering Sea are approximately worth $600 million per year. 91 More 
than 150 species of fish are found in Arctic and the Arctic region alone produces 15% of 
Russia’s seafood.92 In addition to seafood, the Arctic is home to many rare animal species 
including the polar bear, white whale, narwhal and walrus. Export markets to Asia remain very 
promising for both fishing and resource industries, considering countries like China produce a 
large amount of specialized trade and technology and far fewer natural resources. As we see, the 
fishing industry could become lucrative for the Russian Arctic not only for exports, but also for 
the production of jobs in a rather sparsely populated region of Russia.  
Resource extraction in the Arctic is not only important for Russia’s economy but, indeed, 
can be deemed vitally necessary. Therefore, Russia seeks to maintain a certain level of control 
over its respective resources and understandbly reserves the exploitation of its Arctic continental 
exclusively for its own state companies. Geological expeditions are no longer state funded, 
thereofore many privately owned companies initiate resource extraction in the Arctic, yet they 
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still maintain direct ties with the Kremlin, as oil and gas industries remain Russia’s most 
centralized economic sector in order to ensure economic stability.93 However, Russia has 
encountered numerous challenges in exploiting resources due to overdependency on global oil 
prices and the dangerous and expensive nature of resource extraction in the Arctic that has 
necessitated foreign participation and investments. Oil fields have to set up safety protections, 
for example, for extremely low temperatures, icebergs, storms and exceptionally large waves. 
Financially, the infrastructure and technology costs to construct these extraction platforms are 
exceedingly high, not to mention rescue operations that have to reach remote areas. This has led 
to several joint economic ventures with foreign investors in high-cost projects, such as the 
Yamal-LNG project. Author Marlene Laurelle points to the fact it will be difficult for Russia to 
reach its economic output goals in the Arctic without the help of foreign investments, thus 
necessitating international cooperation, though at the same time, it is still difficult to extract in 
remote and extreme conditions even with updated technologies, so Russia and other countries 
may not be able to reach the large estimated percentages of oil deposits. 94 This indicates a 
conflictual competition for resources among Arctic states is unlikely, since states with smaller 
Arctic coastlines and prosperous economies would not benefit to engage in such long-term, 
expensive endeavors. Russia has demonstrated cooperation with foreign participation in its 
Exclusive Economic Zone, albeit not without reservations, so foreign corporations holdings in 
cooperation with Russian firms in the Arctic are capped 50%.95  
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Similarly to the development of maritime transport and Arctic military, Russia is mainly 
interested in developing economic extraction for domestic purposes to achieve economic 
stability within its designated regional Exclusive Economic Zone. A map of estimated 
percentages of oil and gas from the US Geological Survey in Figure 3 below points out that the 
vast majority of the undiscovered resources of the Arctic are not believed to be located in 
disputed areas (i.e. the areas near the center of the Arctic, where the Lomonosov Ridge is 
located), but rather within Arctic coastal states’ EEZ, where the darker blue indicates close to 
100% probability.  
Figure 3: Probability Map of Undiscovered Oil and Natural Gas by Percentage 
  
Source: US Geological Survey 
This gives reason to believe that Russia will not execute land grabs in the Arctic based on its 
primary interests, which reside within its own borders. Russia has expressed interest in pursuing 
exploration in the Lomonosov Ridge, yet is still waiting for approval from the United Nations on 
its claim and has not initiated any further developments in that region.  
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Any policies designed to protect Russia’s energy interests are driven by resource 
concerns that are of dire necessity to Russia’s economy, despite the fact it would benefit from 
greater foreign participation. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the security 
administration and Arctic militaries are closely tied with Arctic economic industries. Russia is 
not solely practicing “patterns of cooperation” or “resource nationalism,” as described by 
Marlene Laurelle, but rather a combination of both in its energy policies in the interest of its 
domestic economy.96  As stated by President Medvedev in 2008, Russia’s “first and main task is 
to turn the Arctic into Russia’s resource base of the 21st century.”97 
Maritime Transport  
In order to reach and export these hydrocarbon resources in the Far North, capable and 
efficient Arctic transportation and nautical infrastructure are required along the Northern Sea 
Route. In addition to natural resources, the NSR stand as the second vital component for the 
revitalization of Russia’s economy. Climate change has recently allowed for three significant sea 
lanes of communication in the Arctic to extend periods ice-free navigation and open to 
international commerce: the Northwest Passage connecting the Atlantic and Pacific through the 
Canadian archipelago; the Northeast Passage above Russia covering the Russian coastline from 
the Kara Sea to the Bering Strait; and the Arctic Bridge that links Russia to Canada over the 
North Pole. In particualr, the Northeast Passage, or the Northern Sea Route, has attracted the 
most international attention due to the fact it has the potential to become the fastest maritime 
passage between Europe and Asia in place of the Suez Canal.98 However, this sea route has 
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become a point of contention considering Arctic passages’ legal status in general are relatively 
ambiguous depending on respective countries’ interpretations of internal, territorial, and adjacent 
waters, access point to sea, or historical reference. Russia defines the Northern Sea Route as “a 
historically existing national unified transport route of the Russian Federation in the Arctic.”99 
The Soviet Union, for example, developed the NSR in order to advance domestic economic goals 
in remote Siberian regions through Arctic passages; between 1950 and 1980, 400 ice breaking 
freights were used on the NSR annually, and the Committee on the Northern Sea Route 
subsidized $400 million a year, despite the fact its activity fell significantly after the 1930s.100  
Canada has made similar claims to the Northwest Passage as internal waters within its EEZ 
territory. To the contrary, the US attempts to claim both the NSR and Northwest Sea Route as 
international straits and has stated its intentions to conduct freedom of navigation operations in 
the vicinity of the NSR. In February of 2019, for example, U.S. Naval Admiral James Foggo, 
stated that “the United States would not allow Russia and China to dominate the Arctic and 
control the Northern Sea Route”101 by conducting these freedom of navigation exercises. 
However, the United States has insufficient basis for asserting these claims considering that it 
has not signed onto the UN Convention on Law of the Seas that specifically designates 
international maritime boundaries in the Arctic. Nevertheless, the NSR continues to play a 
crucial role in Russia’s growing energy extraction and the movement of resources.  
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Due to the collapse of the Committee on the Northern Sea Route in the 1990s, Putin 
created a new centralized service called the Administration of the Northern Sea Route, and 
freight volumes have grown modestly since 2008. 102  In addition, the shipbuilding industry was 
dismantled in the 1990s, creating a need to develop and modernize icebreaking ships to traverse 
the NSR. The Транспортная стратегия Российской Федерации до 2030 года aims to 
redevelop the NSR as an international transport route with the creation of nuclear icebreaking 
ships, ship-monitoring systems and improved shipping ports. It also identifies the need to 
strengthen the NSR as a “river network that links the route to the interior.”103 This 
Транспортная стратегия was revised in 2014 to include enhanced safety measures and “tap 
into the national transport potential”104 with updated infrastructure and transport services. The 
Northern Sea Route has witnessed an increase in the transportation of oil, timber, ores, processed 
metals and liquefied natural gas as a result of recent large investments into the energy sector. In 
addition, increased shipping traffic has brought a proliferation of Russian shipping companies 
including: Lukoil, Norilsk Nickel, Murmansk Shipping Company, Far East Shipping Company 
and state-owned Gazprom and Rosneft. As cited in the “Defense” chapter of my thesis, most of 
the icebreaking fleet from the late 20th century will be decommissioned by 2020 and the revival 
of Russia’s icebreaker fleet has been a priority in the development of the NSR as well. The 
Russian fleet owns approximately 40 conventional and nuclear icebreakers with more in 
development and in planning stages. The Northern Sea Route is rapidly expanding its shipping 
activity, with an estimated total of 18 million tons of goods transported along the route in 2018, a 
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70% increase from 2017. Additionally, Putin has recently stated his intentions in his May decrees 
to reach 80 million tons of good transported along the NSR by the year 2024.105  
Alongside the development of infrastructure, the Northern Sea Route Administration is 
responsible for the procedural component of travel license, permits, environmental measures 
along with safety and navigational equipment. . Most international states utilizing the NSR, with 
the exception of China, do not possess their own ice breaking vessels to travel the NSR and 
require the escort of Russian icebreaker services to prevent accidents from occurring or 
obstruction by ice. Russia therefore benefits from the transportation functions of the Northern 
Sea Route in conjunction with tariffs imposed on foreign vessels traversing the route, including 
fees for icebreaking services, pilots, weather and ice reports, and proof of liability and insurance. 
It is important to note that all of these fees are entirely legal under the UN Convention on Law of 
the Seas, which allows coastal states near ice-covered areas to impose limitations when ice 
conditions increase risks of accidents or pollution. Yet, the U.S. still refuses to accept these rules 
because this would mean recognizing Russia’s sovereignty over the Northern Sea Route.   
As was previously stated, another major priority for the development of the NSR 
concerns the construction of search and rescue stations and effective border control to monitor 
the NSR due to increased traffic. Therefore, the Northern Fleet has taken great measures to 
secure the NSR for safety concerns of the ships along with protecting sovereignty rights, in 
response to statements from countries like the U.S. declaring the NSR an international route. The 
Морская Доктрина emphasizes the importance of SAR, or search and rescue stations, and 
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planned the construction of at least 10 permanent SAR centers along the NSR.106  Satellite 
navigation systems developed in the 1970s were restored in 2011 and have also become an 
integral part of monitoring Arctic region. Russia’s demonstrated development of the Northern 
Sea Route and the Northern Fleet fundamentally concerns commercial usage and in the 
protection of civilian activity. For instance, the main naval shipyards are placed under the control 
of Ministry of Commerce and Economic Development rather than the Ministry of Defense, 
another indication that Russia does not wish to project hard power, but instead defend domestic 
interests.107 In addition, according to scholar Margaret Blunden, Russia’s cautious protection of 
the NSR also responds to the increased presence of foreign vessels in its territory and concern for 
multilateral co-operations overtaking its own interests.108 The activist group Greenpeace USA , 
for example, protested Gazprom’s oil drilling of the Prirazlomnaya platform and attempted to 
scale an oilrig in 2013, but was met by the Russian Coast Guard, who seized the Greenpeace ship 
and arrested the protesters and later released them on charges of hooliganism.109 Similarly, 
beginning in March of 2019, the Russian government now requires foreign military vessels 
traversing the NSR to provide 45 days of advance notice and specifies that each ship will take 
aboard a Russian pilot. This was possibly in response to the French naval ship, the BSAH Rhône, 
which conducted an unannounced transit of the NSR in early 2019. 110  The United States’ 
freedom of navigation operations also remain particularly threatening to Russia because if the 
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route becomes an international strait, Russia would lose revenues from their fees as well an area 
of military strategic importance.  
Despite the fact it appears that Russia is primarily developing the NSR and energy 
resources for domestic use, it still has technological and financial barriers that require it to 
engage in international partnerships and seek foreign investments. As author Marlene Laurelle 
points out, even if the Arctic becomes ice-free this does not guarantee its transformation into a 
major trading route based on technological challenges, inclement weather and financial costs.111 
A 2016 study by the Copenhagen Business School’s Maritime Division claims that the NSR will 
only become internationally economically viable after 2035 due to substantial ice cover and 
transport fees.112 Consequently, the profitability of this sea route should not stand as a threat to 
NATO, but rather should be viewed as a domestic economic prospect that has a long way to go 
in terms of ice melt, infrastructure and financing, especially with the introduction of Western 
sanctions. The viability for shipping industries to remain profitable is unpredictable and 
dependent on global energy prices, though in general the NSR has clearly been of high priority to 
Russia’s economic revival to the Putin administration. 
Partnership with the East  
After 2008, Russia began to look eastward to modernize Russia’s Far East regions, find 
alternative markets for Russian weapons/resources and finance development projects in the 
Arctic. It additionally strengthened economic ties with Asiatic counterparts following the 2014 
Crimean crisis after several Arctic states passed sanctions on Russia, targetting its gas industry. 
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Western oil companies, especially Exxon Mobil, had large extraction energy plans in the Arctic 
that subsequently halted in the aftermath of Russia’s illegall annexation of Crimea in 2014.113  
The sanctions from the US and other countries specifically targeted exports to Russia in deep sea 
drilling, Arctic exploration, and shale oil extraction; therefore, Russia acquired its own well-
drilling rigs and promoted domestic offshore development, but also prompted them to seek 
alternative sources of financing for Arctic oil and gas projects with limited capital and 
resources.114 
 Consequently, Russia signed agreements with the Chinese National Petroleum 
Corporation for the Yamal LNG project, resulting in Chinese entities owning 30% of this new 
project. The initial draft of China’s policy towards the Arctic outlined a proposal to jointly build 
a “Polar Silk Road”115 to foster economic development in the Arctic. In 2018, China released its 
comprehensive Arctic policy, stating intentions to actively participate in Arctic affairs as a major 
stakeholder in the region and declaring itself a “near Arctic state.”116 The pipeline “Power of 
Siberia” connecting Russia to China was completed in March of 2019 and is ready to supply gas 
to mainlnd China.117 While Russia has typically supplied gas to Europe, the creation of this 
pipeline indicated that Russia is turning towards the East for exports along with investments. In 
addition, the China Ocean Shipping Company sent five vessels to traverse the NSR in 2016 and 
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China is building its third ice-breaking capable ship.118 However, despite increased cooperation 
between the two partners, Russia is reasonably increasingly wary of China’s presence and 
growing interest. With the production of its own ice breaking ships, China will pay lower fees for 
Russian sevices that are crucial for the maintenance of the NSR Adminstration, another reason 
Russia has increased military presence in the NSR. In addition to China, South Korea and Japan 
have also expressed their interests in the Arctic as these countries seek to diversify their gas 
import channels by purchasing more LNG from Russia. South Korea also plans to invest in other 
parts of the Arctic economy as well, for example, the Korea Trading & Industries Company 
announced its plan in 2019 to invest millions in the construction of a fish-processing complex in 
Vladivostok.119 Although China remains the prominent Asiatic Arctic player, Russia also builds 
relationships with South Korea and Japan to modernize Russia’s Far East regions, whose borders 
are in close proximity to these countries, meaning they are valuable trading partners. These 
Asiatic countries hold the status of “observer states” in the Arctic Council, without voting 
capabilities.  
Cooperation with foreign countries is financially necessary for Russia, although it also 
fears loss of sovereignty in the region, hence the defensive border security and naval 
development outlined in the previous chapter. Simultaneously, however, these partnerships also 
demonstrate Russia is open to a level of international cooperation in its economic ventures as 
long as it does not threaten its own interests. Some Western European companies such as Britain 
Petroleum and Norway still remain in joint extraction ventures with Russia in the Arctic, though 
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the majority of foreign investments in Russia’s Arctic economy originate from Asian 
counterparts. Even though Russia-Chinese energy cooperation may have also been facilitated by 
mutual dissatisfaction with sanctions imposed upon them by the United States, Russia arguably 
did not turn to Asiatic partnerships in the Arctic to “counterbalance” against NATO as some 
scholars might suggest.120 For example, the Center for Strategic and International Studies report 
suggests, “Recent and intensified efforts appear to be the development of a Russian anti-access 
presence in the Arctic”121 towards Western nations, especially the United States. Conversely, I 
suggest that Russia has instead been forced to redirect its investments with other partners after 
sanctions ended any prospects of Western partnerships in the Arctic in the near future and these 
partnerships remain mainly economic, rather than political.  
In conclusion, Russia has extremely important economic interests in the Arctic with 
regard to sea routes and mineral resources that make a significant contribution to its GDP. Russia 
comparatively to other Arctic states has arguably the most to gain from economic benefits that 
will become vital for the future of its economy, however, low global oil prices, high production 
costs, and insurance premiums may prove an obstacle for Arctic profitability. Russia’s Arctic 
policies are therefore directed at domestic challenges including the development of infrastructure 
and financial investments. Russia will also need to face deteriorating environmental crises that 
may create more costly problems than will eventually outweigh economic benefits. The next 
section will briefly consider the rapidly changing region of the Arctic from a scientific and 
ecological standpoint. 
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VI. Climate Change in the Arctic and its Changing Geography 
While my research is mainly concerned about political and economic concerns regarding 
the Arctic region, it is important to note the nature of climate change that transformed the Arctic 
into an area of opportunity and geopolitical challenges in the first place. Climate change has 
proved beneficial for Russia’s economy over the past few decades, though this may soon 
backfire. There is substantial evidence that human actions have substantially contributed to 
environmental degradation, especially with the release of carbon dioxide emissions into the 
earth’s atmosphere. The Arctic Circle has been one of the most severely impacted regions of the 
world, as this region is warming twice as fast as the rest of the globe. While discoveries of 
hydrocarbons under the ice surface may be incredibly beneficial to Russia’s economy, the 
extraction of these resources poses a number of environmental threats and dangers that may 
prevent extraction in the future. To briefly elaborate on the scientific nature of climate change in 
the Arctic: the solar energy from the sun is reflected on Arctic ice and snow, but absorbed by the 
deep open Arctic waters; when there is an increase in ice melt and open waters this leads to 
reduced sunlight reflected and warms the ocean waters even further, substantially accelerating 
the effects of climate change.  
 The continuation of climate change will inevitably create environmental dangers that will 
negatively impact Russia’s social and economic wellbeing, considering it is the most populous 
portion of the circumpolar Arctic and comprises the largest Arctic coastline. For example, 
permafrost thawing in particular has been identified as a high threat. “Permafrost” is defined as 
continuously permanent frozen ground that exists wherever the average temperature is low 
enough. It currently covers 24% of the northern hemisphere and a report by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates that permafrost will decline by 20-35% in 
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the mid-21st century.122 The melting of permafrost poses dangerous consequences such as release 
of carbon dioxide, methane gases and other unknown potential diseases/greenhouse gases that 
have been frozen under the ice’s surface for thousands of years. It will also cause coastal erosion 
that threatens infrastructure, roads, railways and pipeline because the lack of sea ice near the 
coast prevents it from acting as a buffer to Arctic storms that cause land erosion. For instance, in 
a city in Northern Russia called Yakutsk, 300 building foundations have fractures due to 
permafrost thawing over the past 30 years.123 More importantly, though, the permafrost thaw will 
damage oil and gas infrastructure in the Arctic, causing costly repairs and impeding economic 
progress in the region. Furthermore, scientists have discovered craters from extremely flammable 
methane eruptions in the Yamal Peninsula that have the potential to cause destructive explosions 
considering Russia’s largest LNG project and flammable gas is located in this region.124  
Besides permafrost, pack ice is the other building block of Arctic ice, defined as large, 
floating ice pieces that are continuously attached together in a larger mass; this creates the frozen 
seawater that is subject to summer melts allowing icebreaking ships to navigate the Arctic 
Ocean. Another polar seas phenomenon known as “transpolar drift”125 carries huge sheets of 
pack ice from the Russian Arctic into Greenland’s territory also allowing for more open waters. 
Ice melt exposes the open Arctic waters to carbon dioxide that has caused a 26% increase in 
acidity of the Arctic Ocean since the late 18th century.126 The Arctic Ocean in particular is very 
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susceptible to ocean acidification since it contains large amounts of fresh waters. This could be 
potentially harmful for fish stocks in the Barents Seas and other wildlife, thus impacting Russia’s 
lucrative fishing industries in the Far North. Off the sea onto Russia’s Arctic coast, biodiversity 
changes have negatively impacted reindeer populations, a staple of indigenous Siberian 
communities’ traditional way of life, thus adversely impacting Russia’s social and economic 
prosperity.127  
In addition to future environmental dangers, Russia’s Arctic territory is already heavily 
polluted due to intense industrial activity due to a lack safety measures during the Soviet Union. 
Between 1946-1991, it has been reported that the Soviet Union dumped 13 nuclear reactors and 
an estimated 17,000 into the Kara Sea along with other radioactive waste.128 Russia is concerned 
about the nuclear installations in the Far North including nuclear submarines, reactors and power 
plants, especially in light of the Chernobyl incident in the 1980s. Despite the fact it no longer 
dumps chemicals into the Arctic waters, Russia’s Arctic zone remains vulnerable to 
contamination from the consequences of these actions. At the same time, Russia may reap 
prospective benefits from climate change besides the NSR and oil extraction. For example, 
frozen regions could potentially become fertile lands with more temperate climates, boosting 
Russia’s agricultural economy and also allowing for easier exploration and extraction of natural 
gas in the Arctic Ocean. The growing season would allow for cultivation new crops including 
cotton, tea, and citrus129. Additionally, the Russian Federation’s Fourth National Communication 
predicted that expected warmer temperatures and less heat could result in a net fuel savings of 5-
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10% nationwide by 2025.130  The hydroelectric sector will also probably expand due to an 
increase in water volume in the main Russian rivers that in turn can produce energy. 
Consequently, Russia holds the difficult task of formulating a cost benefit analysis of 
environmental policies with its economy in consideration.  
Russia has adopted a number of environmental protection strategies and has proclaimed 
in its Arctic policies that one of its main goals is to protect its ecosystems. A number of research 
stations in the Russian Arctic research environmental safety, including one on Samoylvsky 
Island focused on shelf-zone permafrost.131  In 2009 Russia passed the “Стратегическая 
программа действий по охране окружающей среды Арктической зоны/ Strategic Action 
Program for the Protection of the Environment: Arctic Zone” identified polluted areas of the 
Russian Arctic and emphasized the importance of protection of the environment.132 In addition, 
the Об утверждении комплексного плана реализации Климатической доктрины 
Российской Федерации на период до 2020 года/The Comprehensive Plan of Implementing the 
Russian Federation Climate Doctrine for the Period until 2020 under the Ministry of Economic 
Development133 identified the need to take into account climate risks in long term goals 
including measures to reduce CO2 emissions from transportation vehicles. Russia also joined 
international climate programs, such as the Clear Air and Climate Coalition and the United 
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Nations Environment Programmes. Moreover, biodiversity changes may force international 
reliance as environmental financial strains may become too great for Russia to handle 
individually and as search and rescue operations become of greater importance. Unfortunately, 
some of these environmental protection measures have been slow or yet to be implemented since 
the Arctic economy takes precedence over Russian Arctic policy. Additionally, environmental 
political activism groups and NGOs are generally not welcomed by the Putin administration, 
deterring environmental activism groups that no longer receive government subsidies. However, 
Russia’s initiatives mentioned above demonstrate it maintains a level of concern and 
acknowledge the fact climate change can negatively impact their region and the rest of the Arctic 
Ocean, which is more operative than the United States, whose leaders do not accept climate 
change as caused by human behavior. The international community has largely criticized Russia 
for its lack of concern for environmental issues and indigenous communities, claiming its 
presence in the Arctic is threatening and uncooperative. An analysis of whether Russia’s 
behaviors are cooperative or not on the international front requires an examination of their 
bilateral relations regarding geopolitics with the other Arctic nations and Russia’s response to 
territorial disputes in the following section.  
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VII. Geopolitics of the Arctic Five  
 Russia’s relations with the sub-Arctic countries and countries with observer status such as 
Finland, Iceland and China have been constructive and cooperative without serious disputes in 
addition to international organizations. On the other hand, the major Arctic states (U.S., Canada, 
Norway and Denmark) have encountered heightened tensions with Russia that pose the potential 
for conflict to erupt if disputes remain unresolved. All of the major Arctic states besides Russia 
are NATO-littoral states that have arguably fundamentally different goals and objectives in the 
Arctic rather. However, rather than seek channels of cooperation, NATO has established Russia 
as the adversary in the region. Figure 4 below is provided for a visual representation of the Arctic 
seas referenced in territorial disputes in the following discussion. 
Figure 4:                                          Arctic Ocean Map 
 
Source: Geology.com 
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NATO vs Russia 
NATO’s and Russia’s interests in the Arctic are essentially opposite: NATO is mainly 
focused on environmental concerns, scientific research and indigenous communities in the 
Arctic, while Russia’s Arctic policies prioritize the protection of its national security, economy 
and Arctic identity. NATO began to increase Arctic activity only after 2008 and outlined its 
priorities in the Arctic region at a security conference in 2009 held in Iceland, which were 
mainly focused on ecological concerns.134 These conflictual agendas have been viewed as 
threatening on both sides and as the only non-NATO Arctic Council member, Russia 
understands it lacks allies in the event of conflict. Russia feels as if NATO is teaming up against 
it in the Arctic to prevent it from achieving its goals, while NATO believes Russia has an 
expansionist aggressive presence in the Arctic that needs to be contained. For example, the 
secretary of the Russian Security Council in 2009 announced that all the major Arctic states were 
conducting a united policy effort against Russia, stating “It is quite obvious that much of this 
doesn’t coincide with economic, geopolitical and defense interests of Russia and constitutes a 
systemic threat to its national security.”135 Conversely, in 2013 Prime Minster Dmitry Medvedev 
warned the expansion of NATO in the Arctic would upset the balance of power and force 
Russian to respond, similarly to when NATO openly broke promises not to spend military 
infrastructure closer to Russia’s border in the 1990s.136 Russia is reasonably worried that NATO 
might encroach into its exclusive Arctic territory in a similar to its fashion membership 
expansion in Eastern Europe on Russia’s borders and in prospect of more navigable Arctic 
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waters. Both lack of communication and military buildup in the Arctic have caused a security 
dilemma between the two groups. In addition, rising geopolitical tensions from other 
international events concerning NATO and Russia, especially the 2014 annexation of Crimea, 
have adversely impacted effective cooperation in the Arctic. As previously mentioned, following 
the annexation of Crimea, Western sanctions specifically targeted Arctic energy development 
and international financing and closed many ongoing and prospective projects for resource 
extraction between Russia and other Arctic states. In addition to economic collaboration, the 
Crimean crisis also negatively impacted political and social relations between NATO and Russia.  
For example, in 2014, Russia held a meeting of the Arctic Council Task Force for Action on 
Black Carbon and Methane, however, Canada and the United States refused to participate 
because of Russia’s “illegal occupation of Ukraine and its continued provocative actions in 
Crimea and elsewhere.”137 The Putin adminstration fears NATO may try to sideline Russia in the 
Arctic region, threatening its economy and national security, as they have done so in Eastern 
Europe with the incorporation of formerly Soviet Union countries on Russia’s borders into the 
NATO alliance. Some Russian experts believe NATO is unlikely to conduct effective Arctic 
policy due to the fact it has a limited scope and resources available for the development of the 
Arctic and the alliance suffers internal discord driven by indvidual ambitions.138 This is arguably 
legitimate due to the fact the largest NATO investor, the United States, as of 2019 has a 
president that does not believe climate change is caused by human activity and the remaining 
Arctic states do not hold a congruent attitude towards Russia’s Arctic presence. Additionally, a 
number of territorial disputes remain in overlapping territory between: U.S.-Canada (in the 
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Beaufort Sea), Denmark-Canada (in Baffin Bay), and Denamark-Norway (in the Hans Islands), 
and these countries all submitted their own competing claims to the Lomonosov Ridge as well.139 
Supporters of NATO may argue that the organization is trying to maintain its role as a leading 
organization providing global security, though the organizatoin as a whole has not demonstrated 
a united Arctic policy, with the exception of military exercises.  
The U.S. in particular can be argued to hold the most contentious relationship with Russia 
in the circumpolar Arctic. There is a widely held belief in Russia that NATO acts as an 
instrument of U.S. military policy that dates back to the Soviet times. The United States strongly 
promotes increased NATO military activity in the Arctic and has been deemed threatening to 
Russian Arctic interests by reason of military activity such as the Freedom of Navigation 
Operations and joint NATO Arctic drills on Russia’s border.140 In addition, a number of Russian 
experts claim that Russia’s first application to expand its continental shelf to the Lomonosv 
Ridge was rejected from pressure from the U.S. Department of State.141 The U.S. opposes 
Russia’s claims to the Lomosonov Ridge, and since they have not yet ratified the UN Convention 
of Law on the Sea, disputes remain over maritime and land boundaries, including the 
overlapping Bering Sea. At the same time, Russia has yet to ratify the boundary line of the 
Bering Sea in the Arctic negotiated in 1990 because the Putin administration did not uphold the 
negotations over the Bering Sea boundaries since it was a product of the Yeltsin administration. 
Although while the Putin and Medvedev administration has held a consistent Arctic strategy for 
the past 19 years, the U.S. strategy appears to have shifted with presidencies. For instance, 
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President Barack Obama labelled the Arctic as an emerging region with strategic U.S. interests 
and promoted international cooperation, environmental protection, support for scientific research 
and respect for indigenous communities. Current President Donald Trump, on the other hand, 
holds an ambiguous and inconsistent Arctic policy, and has stated a limited amount on the issue 
besides the fact he does not consider climate change as a national threat. In an article written by 
the Russian Council on International Affairs, Alexander Sergunin argues that Russia’s relations 
with other Arctic states are developing in a bilateral manner, however, the Trump administration, 
to the contrary, acts in a way that is not conducive to Arctic cooperation. Sergunin references 
President Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement soon after taking office and his 
intention announced in 2017 to conduct a policy of “energy dominance” through oil extraction in 
previously prohibited parts of Alaska, including in the basins of the Chukotka and Beaufort seas 
in the Arctic. Essentially all key officials in charge of U.S. Arctic policy resigned from the 
Department of State over the course of Trump’s presidency and U.S. activity has significantly 
reduced in the Arctic Council. Sergunin also states that the Washington’s partners themselves do 
not yet have a clear idea of the content and priorities of the Trump administration’s Arctic 
Strategy.142   
At an Arctic Council meeting in March of 2019 in Murmansk, the Russian representative 
to the Arctic Council, Nikolai Kornchunov, called for reduced military-political tensions in the 
Arctic and accused the U.S. with the U.K. for tension in the Arctic. He emphasized that Russia 
remains open for constructive cooperation with all Arctic and non-Arctic states and stated that 
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the national strategies of China, Japan and South Korea are also open to this cooperation, though 
the UK and U.S. have challenged this by introducing elements of military confrontation. 
Kornchunov argues that Great Britain’s and U.S.’s Arctic policies are not committed to 
collective approaches, but rather comprises “suspicious, unjustified alarmism…and consideration 
of the Arctic through the prism of geopolitics and perspective theater of war.” 143 Also following 
the Crimean crisis, any military dialogue between the United States and Russia essentially ceased 
and none even existed in the Arctic to begin with, thus perpetrating hostile existing security 
perceptions. The United States’ perception of Russia in the Arctic is arguably more sensationalist 
than other Arctic nations and taken out of context by claiming Russian military expansion as 
belligerent and reminiscent of the Cold War era tendencies. Russia has repeatedly stated it is not 
interested in confrontation with the United States, and instead seeks cooperation through 
international mediums, giving reason to believe it will not engage in a surprise attack against the 
United States, though the United States continues to approach Russia’s presence with hostility.  
Canada is America’s Arctic partner and NATO ally, but its legal and political positions 
on governance and sovereignty in the Arctic are closer to Russia’s than to America’s. Similar to 
Russia, Canada claims the Northwest Sea Route as a domestic strait and requires the registration 
of foreign and domestic vehicles entering Canadian ice-covered areas. Although, in actuality, 
this provokes disputes rather than fosters cooperation since both nations are adhering to their 
respective nationalistic agendas. For instance, Canada has also claimed portions of the 
Lomonosov Ridge as an extension of the North American continental shelf and countered 
Russia’s claims. In addition, Canada has also begun to increase its military presence in the 
Arctic, and authors Sergunin and Konyshev raise the point that these military developments may 
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not all be for defensive measures, such as the joint U.S.-Canada intelligence satellite radar 
system, “NORAD,” used to monitor the Arctic and for the launching of F-35 jet fighters, which 
are utilized for bombings and close air combat.144  
In addition, Denmark became a coastal state in the Arctic via Greenland and lacks 
cooperative strategies with Russia besides a few collaborations on navigation safety. Out of all 
the Arctic coastal states, Denmark in particular considered Russia’s claim to the Arctic shelf 
especially problematic and also claims the Lomonosov ridge is an extension of the Greenland 
Platform. It has conducted numerous expeditions in conjunction with the US to search for 
scientific evidence to support this claim to 62,000 sq. km the ridge.145  
 In January of 2011, The EU called for a more active EU Arctic policy, suggesting 
recommendations about the future geopolitical, economic and social interests in the region, yet 
neglected to mention Russia, especially in terms of regional cooperation and consequently, 
Russia did not support its application for observer status in the Arctic Council.146  On the whole, 
however, Russia presents many more instances of cooperation as opposed to confrontation. Its 
interests may not necessarily be aligned with all nations of the Arctic Five, but Russia has 
arguably been a proponent of acting through international organizations and has demonstrated 
willingness to ascribe several Arctic policies to concerns of Western interest, such as 
environmental protection.  
Cooperation  
 In general, Russia and the U.S. have historically tense relations in many areas of foreign 
policy. The Arctic in particular, however, has not been an area of focus in relations between the 
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two countries and has been generally absent from bilateral negotiations until fairly recently. The 
joint policies between the U.S. and Russia concern maritime borders and scientific work, mainly 
involving the overlapping sea of the Bering Strait and Chukchi Sea. The United States Coast 
Guard and the Kamchatka Territory Border Guard Department of the FSB, for example, jointly 
patrol maritime and air of the Chukotka Sea basin and on the Bering Strait.147 They collaborate 
for search and rescue operations, maritime border security and prevention of terrorism and crime, 
such as illicit trafficking in the Arctic Ocean. In addition, the International Maritime 
Organization adopted a joint US-Russia proposal to designate six shipping lanes, marking areas 
for ships to traverse in the Bering Strait; the map of the lanes will allow countries to avoid the 
many shallows, reefs and islands beyond the lanes and reduce the risk of environmental 
disasters.148 A few other research programs have been developed in regard to marine life in the 
Bering Strait, to with the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the 
Russian Academy of Sciences have been conducting joint expeditions to monitor marine life in 
the Bering Strait and collect oceanographic data. Most of the scientific Russia-U.S. programs are 
initiated through the Arctic Council in order to reduce Arctic pollutants. The Joint Statement on 
Enhanced Fisheries Cooperation signed in April 2013 by the U.S. and Russia, for example, 
agreed to develop a joint research program of Arctic fisheries.149 Furthermore, the shared 
Beringian Heritage Program aims to promote and protect the Arctic indigenous communities. A 
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part of this program initiated a visa waiver for indigenous residents in Chukotoka, Russia to 
travel to Alaska through the Bering Strait and reconnect with relatives.150  
 However, as authors Sergunin and Konyshev point out, these efforts will arguably only 
continue in areas in which Russia and the United States cannot operate without one another, such 
as in search and rescue missions, unless there is a change in the nature of Arctic institutions. 
Although in general Russia, in spite of a complex relationship with the United States in the 
Arctic, has demonstrated willingness and intention to cooperate via international organizations in 
order to address safety and environmental concerns. Russia’s Arctic policy has remained 
consistent over the past two decades while the United States’ Arctic policy changes with 
presidencies and evolving foreign policy, creating difficulties in establishing all-encompassing 
partnerships in the region. For example, a Bilateral Presidential Commission initiated by 
President Obama was created with the purpose of identifying areas of cooperation to reset 
relations with Russia, though this commission was abruptly halted in repose to Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea.151 The Crimean crisis additionally halted any prospective security forums 
at the time involving the U.S. and Russia, such as the Arctic Coast Guard Forum.    
Russia and Canada also hold a number of joint investment projects for Arctic shipping 
between their respective ports and in mining fields; however, these projects are few in number 
and Russia-Canada relations have experienced greater cooperation in the field of scientific 
research and technology. Canadian universities and the Northern Federal University in 
Arkhangelsk, for example, cooperate in scientific projects in biomedical technology and climate 
research. Moscow and Ottawa also have a program for environmental protections named 
“Conservation and Restoration of the Biological Diversity of Northern Territories and 
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Environmental Protection, Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture and Forestry” to prepare for 
potential oil spills and other environmental dangers.152   Although there are some territorial 
overlaps in claims such as over the Lomonosov Ridge, the two countries respect their claims to 
the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage as domestic sea routes. In addition the two 
countries also agree that disputes should be solved through international organizations, and both 
have advocated for the transformation of the Arctic Council into an organization with binding 
policies and a standing secretariat.153  Canada also has been allocating large investments in the 
destruction of decommissioned nuclear submarines and chemical weapons from the Cold war 
period mainly located in Russia’s portion of the Arctic. Canada and the US may also cooperate 
with Russia in the area of the development of Arctic air routes and lines of communication in the 
Northern Air Bridge, first traversed by the Arctic heroes in the 1930s. 
Russia’s closest Arctic neighbor, Norway, shares a border with Russia and therefore has 
encountered territorial disputes, many of which have subsequently been resolved. The Russian-
Norwegian dispute over the Barents Sea was the longest and most complex territorial disputes in 
the Arctic, dating back to the early 1900s, though arguably one of the most important negotiation 
successes in the Arctic to date. After years of debate over this area, Norway and Russia finally 
agreed upon maritime boundaries in the shared Barents Sea in 1977, but prohibited geological 
and gas exploration and, therefore, established a Maritime Fisheries Protection Zone that allowed 
Russian fishermen to have access to fisheries. Although in the 1990s, new restrictions on 
“unregulated and unreported” fishing within the Barents Sea became more strict and Norwegian 
Coast Guards attempted to arrest Russian fishing ships on several occasions over the course of 
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the next two decades, greatly provoking Russia.154 However, rather than engage in conflict or let 
tension develop, Norway and Russia were able to reach an agreement over the Barents Sea in 
April of 2010 during Medvedev’s visit to Norway, during which he also announced intentions 
for joint energy development.155 The two countries were able to achieve this in the interest of 
resource cooperation and negotiations. Norway-Russia have since remained stable by way of 
continued communications between the Norwegian militaries and the Russian Northern Fleet and 
dialogue in the Joint Fisheries Commission, which have set quotas yearly for shared fish stocks. 
Andreas Østhagen attributes this cooperation to various channels of communication and personal 
relations that maintain low tension.156 Joint steps are also being taken with Norway for 
enviromental protection of the marine fisheries, prevention of poaching and improved 
collaboration in search and rescue operations in the Barents Sea. Additionally, the Northern Sea 
Route runs right alongside Norway’s border, so Norway benefits in cooperating with Russia 
from using the route to export natural resources and developing northern ports. Similarly to 
Canada, Norway also holds joint educational programs with Russian universities, including 
The University of Tromsø, of which Mikhail Gorbachev was an honorary doctor. In addition, in 
the border regions of Finmark and Murmansk, residents are eligible to obtain a three-year ID 
card introduced in 2010 to travel across Russia and Norway without a visa 15 days at a time.157 
Morevoer, sanctions on Russian companies after 2014 by other NATO countries did not deter the 
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Norwegian company Roseneft from developing a partnership with Gazprom in the Barents Sea 
and Sea of Okhotsk. The Norwegian state oil company Statoil, also called Equinor, recently 
signed a deal for the developemnt of the Severo-Komsomolskoya field in the Yamal-Nenets 
region, another indication of economic cooperation. However, there remain points of contention 
on occasion in the Slavabard Archipelago with regard to fishing rights and other economic and 
research activities that continue to tax Russian companies in the region.158  
As a final point, there are many more demonstrated points of cooperation than contention 
in Russia’s bilateral relations with Arctic countries. According to the Centre for High North 
Logistics in Oslo, Russia is building more search and rescue infrastructure than any other 
state.159 Russian officials are also often praised by international organizations such as the Arctic 
Council and Barents Euro-Arctic Council for its collaboration efforts in the Arctic in building 
stability and trust.160 Russia seeks to exploit and preserve the Arctic in conjunction with laws set 
forth by international organizations, but has also expressed its discontent with any intentions to 
“internationalize” the Arctic and the Northern Sea Route for recognizable reasons of wanting to 
maintain sovereignty and is reluctant to provide observer states the benefit of full member status 
of the Arctic Council. Russia fears this will legitimize more states to demand their own 
extraction sites in Arctic, thus threatening Russia’s economy. My research on this topic leads me 
to believe that collaboration with current members of the Arctic Council is necessary before 
allowing other states to become involved, who could potentially raise issues in the region from a 
disjointed international situation. 
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Russia’s Arctic policies reflect a balance between maintaining cooperative bilateral 
relationship with the Arctic Council and protecting its own national interests. Currently, 
according to Laurelle, “none of the Arctic coastal states are involved in violent confrontation or 
unlawful occupation”161 however, if tension increases between NATO and Russia, the 
circumpolar Arctic will face difficult challenges and possible confrontation in the future. The 
following section will suggest policy recommendations in order to avoid this situation.  
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VIII. Conclusion and the Future of the Arctic: Problems and Solutions 
 
Problems  
Due to the nature of my topic, it is difficult to predict all the possible implications without 
knowing the direction of climate change and international politics for the remainder of the 21st 
century. However, since climate change will not likely halt or reverse within the next few 
decades, it is logical to assume that with melting ice caps in the Arctic, international interest and 
tensions will continue to determine economic, environmental, and social implications of the 
region. As Russia is the leading Arctic player and most developed in terms of infrastructure and 
military equipment, it would be in the interest of the remaining Arctic nations to foster 
cooperation with Russia if they wish to utilize the Northern Sea Route, promote sustainable 
development, and avoid possible military confrontation. Although Arctic militaries do not 
currently appear to be instigating physical confrontation, it cannot be entirely ruled out, 
especially in areas where countries’ economies are at stake (in particular, Russia). No other 
Arctic player has the military resources and capability as Russia has with over 50 military bases 
in the Arctic region, even if the Arctic militaries of all the remaining states combined. Despite 
Russia’s large military, it will not likely become the instigator of a potential conflict in the Arctic 
Circle, since it remains in its own interest to maintain stability in the zone. However, this 
stability is threatened by NATO’s militarization targeted at Russia. Scholar Margaret Blunden 
points out increasing defense coordination among the Western states, accentuates “Russia's sense 
of strategic isolation,”162 and instead should be balanced by re-assurance and confidence 
building.  In addition, while the Arctic may be evolving into a region of economic opportunity, it 
is not becoming safer, and indeed faces a number of environmental and logistical dangers with 
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increased traffic and a changing ecosystem. As previously stated in the chapter on climate 
change, warmer climates may become beneficial towards Russia in some respects, but may also 
cause irreversible dangers and pollution that would outweigh the short term benefits. For 
example, oil and nuclear spills, shipping collisions, coastal erosion and melting permafrost 
continue to be potential problems in the Arctic that requires the collaboration between Arctic 
states. With the continuation of the current state of affairs in the Arctic, a lack of coordination 
between the Arctic coastal states will accentuate rather than solve security issues and 
environmental degradation.  
In my opinion, the two most critical obstacles interfering with coordination between NATO 
and Russia in the Arctic currently include the following: 1) the lack of military forums for 
security negotiations and, 2) Western rhetoric claiming Russia’s expansionist intentions in the 
Arctic as a sequel to Stalin’s military industrial complex and return to a Cold War era of 
relations with remaining the Arctic members. Both of these issues combined have caused 
unnecessary levels of re-militarization in the Arctic that has only generated increased tensions 
and security issues that could potentially result in violent conflict. These problems arise from the 
shortcomings of international organizations, specifically the Arctic Council, the leading 
international forum in the region. The Arctic Council discusses almost every matter and dispute 
pertaining to the Arctic, besides the most arguably pressing and dangerous of them all, that of 
militarization. It was by insistence of the United States in the late 1990s that security 
negotiations were prohibited to be discussed at the Arctic Council “for fear that this could send 
mixed and harmful signals of potential militarization of the Arctic.”163 However, this has instead 
arguably created heightened levels of militarization than had military matters been open for 
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discussion and greater confidence existed between Arctic states. Additionally, the Arctic Council 
has been ineffective at solving territorial disputes and enforcing regulations. For example, the 
Arctic Council has never addressed the fact the United States has still not ratified the UN 
Convention on Law of the Seas, considered a central component of Arctic multilateral 
cooperation and the resolution of territorial disputes. U.S. presidents in particular have provided 
an obstacle to advancement of the Arctic Council, including President George W. Bush, who 
insisted that that the Arctic Council should remain a high-level forum devoted to issues within its 
current mandate, and not be transformed into a formal international organization with assessed 
contributions.164 Furthermore, Canada and in particular the United States frequently remain 
absent from Arctic forums and Arctic Council initiatives hosted by Russia, including a forum 
conducted on April 9th, 2019 in St. Petersburg.165 By reason of heightened tensions between US 
and Russia in past decades generally and the fact that the Arctic is the shortest distance between 
the two countries for nuclear attacks, the two countries would be well advised to pay more 
consideration to improving relations in order to avoid possible catastrophic implications. 
I also believe the ineffectiveness of international organizations has contributed to a 
significant portion of confusion and apprehension from other Arctic coastal states concerning 
Russia’s Arctic policies and consequently antagonistic rhetoric against Russia in the region. 
Without re-assurance of interests and intentions of Russia’s economic and military investments 
and intentions in the Arctic through Arctic forums, NATO states have assumed hostile intentions 
and labeled Russia as an aggressor that needs to be contained. Others point to the fact there is a 
duality of narratives in Russian Arctic policy, wavering between acting in the interest of 
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international organizations and in its own national interest. However, it can be argued that its 
policies are a reflection of the inconsistency of the Arctic Council’s policies, meaning Russia 
seeks to promote cooperation in areas such as search and rescue operational and environmental 
issues, but remains defensive and self interested on security interests since the Arctic Council 
excludes discussion of security negotiations. Russia’s policies also reflect a balance between 
protecting its national interests and promoting sustainable international collaboration that do not 
interfere with its own security. Therefore, effective international organizations that identify 
common challenges to the Arctic nations will be necessary to adapt to shifting climatic, 
economic, and political environments.  
 
Recommendations  
 
In general, one could argue it is difficult for international organizations to effectively 
enforce the rule of law without the assistance of a military force or a legitimate government.  
However, international institutions stand as the best alternative solution to potential conflicts 
because they provide a forum for negotiations that allows for greater transparency, 
communication and collective effort for an overall safer Arctic. Arguing from a neo-liberalist 
standpoint,166 international institutions are critical to regions of the world like the Arctic that 
require international cooperation because they: set rules; lower transaction costs of collaboration 
and enforcement; provide information; and require repeated interaction, that in turn creates 
reciprocity and interdependence. The Arctic is subject to regional and international law, though 
cooperation of all the states is needed for the functioning of the Circle as a whole since it is all 
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interconnected. Otherwise, the region could potentially suffer from military confrontation or 
natural disasters. Without pursuing the development of capable international organizations in the 
Arctic, the short-term national interests of each state of the Arctic Five may destabilize and 
contradict overarching peace strategies. For Russia in particular, it cannot fully realize its 
economic potential in the Arctic without the foreign assistance and international cooperation. In 
order to avoid potential catastrophic situations and create a sustainable Arctic, first, I suggest the 
creation of a security forum to discuss militarization matters and set standards to avoid security 
dilemmas and secondly, I recommend the strengthening and revision of existing organizations 
like the Arctic Council and the Convention of the Law on the Sea in order to promote 
cooperation in areas of economic, scientific, and public safety. Lastly, I suggest Russia revisit its 
own foreign policy in order to improve relations with NATO.  
The creation of a forum for security negotiations would permit transparency of military 
operations, equipment and personnel. A large portion of hostility between NATO and Russia in 
the Arctic arguably derives from uncertainty on military matters. For example, NATO countries 
believed Russia’s unannounced naval exercises in 2015 were excessive demonstration of 
force.167 Therefore, I propose the creation of a military forum that should require declaration of 
military exercises should make provisions for announcing military exercises and foreign vessels 
is necessary in order to avoid any disputes. This will provide uniformity on international laws, 
such as Russia and Canada’s recent requirements of foreign military vessels to register while 
entering their respective EEZ territories. Whenever Russia or NATO conducts military activity 
for strategic deterrence purposes, I suggest the security forum should provide methods of 
reassurance and communication, otherwise the each side will assume hostile intentions. I also 
agree with Alexander Sergunin who suggests early-warning radar systems for naval activities in 
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sensitive zones and for the overall limitation of military activities in the region.168  In addition to 
the creation of a security forum, whether that is included in the Arctic Council or created in a 
separate organization, I propose regular contacts should be established on matters relating to the 
Arctic between the US Coast Guard and Russian Federal Security Service, whose states arguably 
have the most contentious relations between all Arctic states’ militaries. Norway-Russia military 
relations, for example, have witnessed successful cooperation in this respect between their naval 
forces and currently maintain peaceful bilateral relations in regards to the Barents Sea. A 
transparent and effective security forum could also serve as an exemplary model for cooperation 
in other areas of Arctic relations. Cooperative military relations between the U.S. and Russia, for 
example, could enhance bilateral shipping, scientific, and emergency response initiatives in the 
Bering Strait and other overlapping Arctic territories.  
Secondly, I propose the Arctic Council take on a more assertive mandating posture than a 
passive forum and that the UN Convention of Law on the Seas reorganize its text of the Law on 
the Seas Treaty to efficiently and expeditiously settle territorial disputes. Currently, the Arctic 
Council arguably acts more like a forum than a treaty-mandating international organization able 
to implement rule of law concerning all five coastal states. A standing secretariat should require 
all members of the Arctic Council attend annual meetings. I also suggest that mandates from 
these meetings must require the unanimous decision of all members and the Council should 
include repercussions for those states that do not adhere to these decisions. A complete and 
comprehensive set of regulations that would cover all possible areas of interaction between states 
does not exist, which in fact ultimately leads to disputes and ambiguous situations. The Arctic 
Council should also collaborate more often with other Arctic international organizations 
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including the Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation and the International Maritime Organization in 
order to strengthen partnerships as a whole in the Arctic and identify policies and solutions for 
issue specific areas, such as maritime transport in each overlapping corridor. Although a number 
of bilateral environmental, scientific, economics efforts and programs exist among the Arctic 
coastal states, policies encompassing all of the Arctic Five nations will become necessary, 
otherwise Arctic policy will remain inconsistent and inexplicit. 
In addition, I suggest the UN Convention of the Law on the Sea take steps to reorganize 
the language of its laws in the resolution of territorial disputes in the Arctic. For example, the 
organization currently requires 10-15 years once submitted to rule on a country’s claim to extend 
its EEZ, such as the one to the Lomonosov Ridge, and then only decides whether a claim falls in 
the definition of the Law on the Sea Treaty, thus leaving it up to the states to negotiate in the 
event of any competing claims. The Arctic Ocean is comprised of zones subject to regional and 
international law, however, many overlapping claims exist in international areas, especially to 
the Lomonosov Ridge and these disputes have not been resolved since the first submission to 
portions of the Ridge in 2001. The resolution of territorial disputes remains incredibly important 
to cooperation of the Arctic states in general since it is difficult for states to initiate partnerships 
in other areas of scientific and economic development if they cannot first agree on the specified 
boundaries. While the Arctic international organizations have achieved a number of 
accomplishments in cooperation between the coastal states, there still remains room for 
improvement especially in areas of security negotiations and maritime boundary laws since 
NATO and Russia have demonstrated apprehension in diplomatic cooperation and therefore 
require an effective forum to cooperate.  
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Finally, I suggest Russia on the domestic level take initiative to enhance cooperation 
between itself and NATO, as the leading Arctic player. It can emphasize its initiative for 
international cooperation by composing a law separate from other Arctic policies that solely 
focuses on areas of cooperation between Arctic states. This would reassure NATO member states 
that Russia’s intentions are in fact cooperative and diplomatic, especially in light of other foreign 
policy tensions in Crimea. Russia may reconsider other foreign policy decisions via Ukraine and 
the Baltic States in order to decrease tensions so that NATO states may lift sanctions on Russia 
that are adversely affecting its oil industry in the Arctic. In addition, Russia may consider the 
option of expanding the number of interested participants, or observer nations, in the Arctic 
Council. It has understandably been apprehensive to include a larger number of nations into the 
Arctic that do not share coastal boundaries to protect its sovereignty, however, expanding this 
circle of relevant experts can help combat future ecological dangers and provide investments into 
infrastructure and businesses. Lowering the barriers to entry will allow the Arctic as a whole 
economy to thrive and to Russia’s benefit, especially with the expanded use of the Northern Sea 
Route for international shipping. 
 
Conclusion 
 
My research on Russia’s interests and policies leads me to believe that its intentions in the 
Arctic do not match existing literature and rhetoric on Russia’s aggressive behavior in the Arctic 
and that it is highly unlikely to execute “land grabs” or initiate violent confrontation in the 
region. I do not believe President Putin’s Arctic policies and intentions are aimed towards 
uncooperative expansionism, but instead following a consistent, logical, and predictable pattern 
in defense of its own domestic interests. Its national Arctic policies are aimed to protect its 
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economy through the Northern Sea Route and natural resources, while also seeking to establish 
Russia as the Arctic hegemon, militarily and politically. As the largest and most populous Arctic 
coastal state, the Arctic is arguably more strategically important to Russia than any other Arctic 
nation; for instance, the Arctic comprises less than 1% of the United States’ GDP, compared to 
nearly a quarter of Russia’s.169 In addition, the Far North has historically been considered with a 
sense of pride to Russian national identity and Russia does not wish to sidelined by newly 
emerging Arctic countries, especially considering its current economic situation requires a large 
dependence on newly discovered oil fields. Russia’s militarization of the Arctic consequently 
reflects an increased securitization of interests, improvements in safety measures along the 
Northern Sea Route, and modernization of outdated equipment. I argue Russia is not necessarily 
a benevolent or belligerent force in the Arctic, but is justified in its motivations and is behaving 
in the same manner as any other nation would, given its historic, economic, political and geo-
strategic significance to Russia.  
While Russia’s interests are multifaceted, they do not appear to be geared towards conflict. In 
its official Arctic policies and statements in the 21st century, Russia has stated that it would not 
be logical or feasible to go to war with NATO members states and has never indicated intentions 
to act aggressively or uncooperatively, with the one exception of the flag planted on the North 
Pole in 2007. While one may argue Russia’s official policies do not reflect President Putin’s 
actual intentions, my research on Russia’s geopolitical relations in the Arctic suggests his actions 
indeed do conform to his Arctic policies. His policies have advocated for international 
collaboration in the Arctic and his actions have demonstrated the ability to conduct bilateral and 
multilateral negotiations and concern for environmental and safety protections in the 
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international zone, indicating relations could improve between the Arctic states if the 
international organizations become more effective in the near future. Even though Russia still 
lags behind in areas such as environmental concerns and rights for indigenous members, this 
does not eliminate the fact it is open to international cooperation and development of the region 
in so much as it maintains its own interests. Therefore, Russia’s Arctic policies have reflected an 
attempt to balance pride and protection with international unity. Unfortunately, however, other 
Arctic countries and Western states continue to view Russia’s presence in the Arctic through a 
narrow lens that will most likely become problematic in the future of a fragile geopolitical 
system unless attitudes are changed. An over-simplification of Russia’s intentions attributing it 
as the regional adversary towards NATO is arguably more dangerous than any other current 
disputes or conflicts in the Arctic considering it causes a security dilemma and only fosters 
apprehensions. For example, on April 2nd, 2019 NATO’s Secretary General Jans Stoltenberg 
addressed a U.S. joint Congress and called for NATO to expand in order to deal with Russia, 
saying, “We will need to continue to deal with a more assertive Russia…and we see a pattern of 
Russian behavior, including a massive military buildup from the Arctic to the Mediterranean.”170 
Unless appropriate steps are taken to secure the efficacy of international organizations, this 
problem will persist and relations will continue to deteriorate. Therefore, my policy 
recommendations include a number of measures for the reorganization of international 
institutions to alleviate tensions and promote partnerships along with the clarification of Russian 
foreign policy.  
In the broader scheme of politics and international relations, an improvement in US-Russia 
relations in the Arctic could provide for better relations between the countries more generally 
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that have long suffered from tense diplomacy. As I have stated in previous chapters, the Crimean 
crisis negatively affected US-Russia and NATO-Russia relations not only in Ukraine, but 
indirectly affected cooperation in the Arctic as well. Therefore, I have reason to believe foreign 
policy initiatives are not mutually exclusive to specific regions and that an improvement in the 
Arctic will lead to less tension and enhanced understanding between the United States and 
Russia. Since Arctic cooperation requires not only military partnerships, but also economic, 
scientific, and political partnerships, the all-encompassing nature of Arctic cooperation could 
become extremely beneficial to US-Russia and Russia-NATO relations as a whole if effectively 
conducted. In addition to diplomatic relations, an improvement in overall Arctic ecological 
cooperation would prove beneficial to the global climate as well. Studies have shown that 
temperature changes in the Arctic, which is warming twice as fast as the rest of the world, will 
adversely impact weather patterns across the globe. For instance, a study conducted by the 
University of Wyoming indicates the warming of the Arctic contributes to droughts in other 
regions of the world due to a weakening of temperature difference in the poles and tropics.171  
As the Arctic enters into the next segment of the 21st century, attention should be drawn not 
to Russia’s military ability and hegemony, but towards potential avenues of cooperation between 
Arctic coastal states. The largest threat to NATO at hand in the Arctic is not Russia, but rather 
the unintended consequences of self-interested nations refusing to cooperate with one another, 
including environmental degradation and unconventional security concerns. However, with the 
current state of affairs and standing disputes between nations in the Arctic, a potential military 
confrontation is not impossible. The devolution of relations between Arctic nations should be 
addressed sooner rather than later by the Arctic Council and member states if the world hopes to 
witness the sustainable development of the region in the future. 
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